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Introduction 
 
 
For a number of years, the Institutes comprising the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network (PNI) 
have organized a workshop during the sessions of the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice with the 
purpose of providing in-depth information, and stimulating debate 
and exchange among member governments. During its fifteenth 
session in April 2006, the Commission focused on the question of 
how to maximize the effectiveness of the technical assistance 
provided to member states in the crime prevention and justice 
sector. The PNI was once again invited to organize a workshop on 
this theme at the beginning of the Session of the Commission.1  
The workshop was, as usual, the result of the coordinated efforts 
of many of the Institutes of the Network, with the final organization 
and the preparation of the background paper being undertaken by 
the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC, 
Montreal, Canada) and the International Centre for Criminal Law 
Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR&CJP, Vancouver, 
Canada). This book presents the proceedings of the workshop 
which are published by the European Institute for Crime Prevention 
and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI, Helsinki, 
Finland) to ensure the wider dissemination of some of the very 
useful papers and analyses which provided a basis for discussion 
in Vienna.2  
The workshop offered participants an opportunity to consider 
how to enhance the effectiveness of the technical assistance 
provided to Member States in the field of crime prevention and 
criminal justice. It was clear to all participants that technical 
assistance does not always deliver the results that it promises. Its 
impact is often quite modest. Throughout the workshop the 
emphasis was, therefore, placed on the importance of identifying 
best practices, evaluating current efforts, and learning from our 
collective experience. Participants were unanimous in noting that 
piecemeal and ad hoc technical assistance activities, although still 
the rule rather than the exception, should be avoided in the future. 
The need to identify priorities for action and to coordinate efforts 
across agencies was also recognized, and that led to some 
discussion of the role of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC, Vienna, Austria) in the delivery of technical 
assistance and capacity building programmes.  
                                                     
1 See Annex 1 for a list of all the Institutes.  
2 See Annex 2 for the workshop Agenda. 
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The need for technical assistance which aims to strengthen the 
crime prevention and justice sector as a whole, and to build a 
sustainable institutional capacity in receiving countries, was at the 
heart of the discussion. Many participants, particularly those from 
receiving countries, called for more integrated and cohesive 
strategies for strengthening their own institutional and operational 
capacities. Other participants referred to the growing need for 
international cooperation in fighting various transnational threats, 
and underlined that the ability of each Member State to cooperate 
at the international level ultimately depends on the capacity of its 
institutions. 
Concern about the effectiveness of technical assistance is not 
just a fleeting preoccupation. The needs for assistance are great 
and growing, and the means to provide it are limited. The 
effectiveness of technical assistance is of crucial importance to 
receiving countries. For them the stakes are high. They recognize 
the interrelationship between sustainable development, security 
and justice and understand how criminal justice reform is essential 
to the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. 
The workshop was chaired by His Excellency Ambassador 
Shahbaz of Pakistan. The Moderator was Jay Albanese, (then) 
Chief of the International Centre at the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ, Washington D.C., USA) and the Rapporteur was Gioacchino 
Polimeni, (then) Director of the United Nations Interregional Crime 
and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI, Turin, Italy). His report on 
the workshop captures the main ideas that emerged from the 
discussion. Some of these had been suggested in the general 
background paper prepared with the assistance of our colleagues 
from the PNI. Discussion focused on the importance of capacity 
building and ensuring ownership of technical assistance initiatives, 
and the need for greater coordination among the PNI, the UN 
Crime Commission and donor countries.  
At the start of the workshop, Ugljesa Zvekic, Head of Strategic 
Planning, UNODC, presented the integrated strategy on security 
and justice which has been developed by UNODC. That 
presentation was followed by four interventions which looked at 
different aspects of technical assistance effectiveness and at 
initiatives to enhance it.  
Summarizing the workshop Background Paper, Margaret Shaw, 
ICPC, presents some of the main challenges facing donor and 
recipient countries in the delivery of technical assistance, the 
merging consensus in the development aid field, amounting to a 
paradigm shift on how assistance can be more effective and 
sustainable, and discusses key components for effective and 
sustainable assistance. Patrick Dölle, Administrator, EuropeAid, at 
the European Commisssion, offers a paper which illustrates the 
shift in approach to development assistance which is now being 
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privileged by the European Union, with its focus on the principles of 
coherence, coordination and complementarity. Yvon Dandurand, 
ICCLR&CJP, takes a more careful look at some of the specific 
challenges involved for small states in seeking and obtaining 
effective assistance.  
These introductory papers are followed by five papers looking at 
specific technical assistance initiatives and which illustrate some of 
the principles for effective assistance: they include a paper by 
Masahiro Tauchi, (then) Director of the United Nations Asia and 
Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders (UNAFEI, Tokyo, Japan), on the revitalization of the 
volunteer probation aides system in the Philippines; a paper by Tor 
Tanke Holm of the Norwegian Police Directorate, on bilateral and 
multilateral policing assistance in Serbia and Montenegro which 
aims to promote local ownership and sustainability; a paper by 
Ronald Woodbridge of the United Nations Latin American Institute 
for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(ILANUD, San José, Costa Rica) on that Institute’s assistance in 
Latin America and the Caribbean region especially in the area of 
prison overcrowding and prison reform; a short presentation by 
Masamba Sita and Patrick Mwaita of the United Nations African 
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders 
(UNAFRI, Kampala, Uganda) on the development of a social work 
in prisons and prisoner reintegration programme in Uganda; and, a 
report by the International Institute of Higher Studies in 
Criminal Sciences (ISISC) and the International Human Rights 
Law Institute (IHRLI) of DePaul University College of Law which 
reviews a number of initiatives designed and implemented by these 
two institutes to contribute to national reconstruction, scholarship, 
training, and technical assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq. Each of 
these papers reveals a different dimension of technical assistance, 
and demonstrates the importance of the political, economic and 
institutional context in which technical assistance activities take 
place.  
Finally, this collection is completed by two more general papers 
which, while not presented during the workshop, were given at the 
beginning of the deliberations of the Commission on this thematic 
issue. They are included here because of their relevance in 
emphasizing two crucial aspects of sustainable assistance: funding 
and the monitoring and evaluation of results. The first paper, by 
Patrick Dölle, addresses the all-important question of funding for 
technical assistance, outlining the flurry of recent changes to the 
European Union’s financial framework which are designed to 
support the new approach to assistance and to maximize the 
impact of the EU’s investment in that field. The second paper is a 
brief intervention by Yvon Dandurand who was invited to launch 
the discussion on evaluation and the measures which could 
maximize the learning that takes place through systematic 
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evaluation of the impact of capacity building and technical 
assistance activities. 
We are very grateful to HEUNI, and in particular to Terhi 
Viljanen, for undertaking to publish these proceedings. We would 
also like to thank all the speakers as well as colleagues from the 
PNI who contributed to the success of the workshop. We hope that, 
with this publication, the dialogue and learning will go on and that 
technical assistance in crime prevention and criminal justice will be 
carried to another level, one which reflects this emerging 
consensus on how it can be made more effective and sustainable.  
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Report from the Rapporteur 
 
 
Gioacchino Polimeni  
Director of UNICRI 
 
 
A workshop on the theme “Maximizing the effectiveness of 
technical assistance provided by Member States in crime 
prevention and criminal justice – Solutions for the future: key 
components for effective technical assistance” was organized by 
the Institutes comprising the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme Network (PNI). The workshop was 
chaired by H.E. Ambassador Shahbaz (Pakistan), First Vice-
Chairman of the Commission for its fifteenth session and Chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole. Six presentations were made at the 
workshop covering two main thematic fields related to ways of 
enhancing the effectiveness of technical assistance and recent 
technical assistance experiences respectively. 
In his opening remarks, the Chairman noted that the objectives 
of the Workshop were to outline factors impeding the effectiveness 
of technical assistance and consider possible remedies, as well as 
to provide models and projects exemplifying successful approaches 
to technical assistance and stimulate discussion. 
In his introductory statement, the Chief of the Strategic Planning 
Unit, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, UNODC, 
stressed the particular role of the Programme Network Institutes in 
promoting knowledge building, strengthening national and 
international policies, as well as assisting in the implementation of 
United Nations standards and norms, including the relevant 
normative instruments. He further illustrated that, within the 
framework of the overall UNODC strategy, the assistance provided 
to Member States should cover a whole range of issues related to 
prevention, rule of law, treatment and reintegration and analysis of 
thematic and cross-sectoral trends for effective policy formulation 
and operational responses. In that respect, it would be important to 
have in place a number of enabling conditions for rendering such 
assistance more effective and efficient, such as diversification of 
funding, alignment of resources with existing strategies and 
performance, and coordination among the key players in the field. 
The observer for the International Centre for the Prevention of 
Crime (ICPC) made a presentation on the key components for 
effective technical assistance and possible future solutions towards 
revitalizing technical assistance activities in the area of crime 
prevention and criminal justice. Using as an example the 
incomplete effort to establish and maintain on an ongoing basis a 
database on international projects in crime prevention and criminal 
justice in Central and Eastern Europe, she put emphasis on the 
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need to utilize the lessons learned in order to achieve better results 
and address the new challenges in the field of technical assistance 
more effectively. Consideration was further given to certain 
impeding factors which rendered technical assistance inadequate 
and ineffective, such as the lack of sufficient resources; the 
uncoordinated, fragmented and scattered nature of the assistance 
provided; the partial failure of existing coordination mechanisms; 
the failure to take into account the receiving country’s needs and 
interests and, thus, instil a sense of ownership; the lack of 
sensitivity to the specific context of the recipient country; the 
neglect of areas requiring interventions as a result of the failure to 
embrace a more comprehensive and integrated approach to 
technical assistance; the failure to take into account the capacity of 
the receiving countries to implement or benefit from technical 
assistance programmes; and corruption and abuse phenomena. In 
the speaker’s view, recent initiatives at the national, regional and 
international levels have already shown that a consensus is 
emerging on a set of approaches and possible guidelines aimed at 
providing efficiency to technical assistance activities. In that 
context, she specified the following key elements: promotion of 
comprehensive and holistic approaches to strengthen the justice 
sector as a whole; country-led programming to stimulate country 
ownership and sustainability; building on existing strengths and 
favouring of long-term assistance; participation and active 
involvement of civil society; and research-based and results-
oriented monitoring and evaluation. 
The observer for the European Commission, EuropeAid, Unit 
“Security and Migration”, provided an overview of the European 
Union strategy on aid effectiveness. He stressed that the European 
Union has fully endorsed the five partnership commitments of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 concerning 
ownership by the partner countries, alignment of donors with 
partner countries, harmonization of donors actions, managing for 
results and mutual accountability of both donors and partners. He 
also made reference to the four additional commitments taken by 
the European Union: increasing use of multi-donors arrangements 
in capacity building assistance; channelling 50 per cent of 
government-to-government assistance through country systems; 
avoiding the establishment of new project implementation units; 
and reducing the number of uncoordinated missions by 50 per cent. 
He put emphasis on the establishment of a joint multi-annual 
programming framework of the European Commission with partner 
countries and other donors, as well as on the need to develop 
operational principles for ensuring coordination and revise the 
European Union rules on co-financing with a view to facilitating joint 
financing arrangements. He further noted that, in the field of crime 
prevention and criminal justice, efforts of the European Union 
geared towards increasing the effectiveness of technical assistance 
and included the elaboration of a concept and guidelines on 
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security system reform; the elaboration of rules and tools to recruit 
the appropriate experts; and the elaboration of commonly agreed 
indicators on the results of technical assistance in the field of 
governance. 
The observer for the International Centre for Criminal Law 
Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR&CJP) focused his 
attention on technical assistance in small States. He underlined 
that the effectiveness of technical assistance was dependent on the 
adaptation of methods to differing country situations, taking into 
consideration: the political and institutional context; geopolitical 
factors; psychological attitudes, including the level of public support 
for reforms; the economic circumstances; the normative framework; 
the government effectiveness; the commitment of and progress 
made in controlling corruption; and the civil society involvement. 
Further reference was made to the vulnerabilities of many small 
States arising from factors such as globalization and transnational 
crime, as well as to the difficulties they encountered due to the 
limited capacity and human resources and the inability to fully 
participate in global regimes and international policies and treaties. 
The speaker argued that the justice sector was particularly affected 
in most of these States by the limited capacity of existing 
institutions and the declining trends in development assistance. He 
took note of the need to establish priorities and promote regional 
approaches. Furthermore, he underscored that the coordination 
among multiple donors was important for exploring flexible 
programming options and reducing the transaction costs for the 
small States. Equally important for the donors and technical 
assistance providers would also be to tailor their tools and 
instruments to suit the institutional capacity of such States, as well 
as to adopt whole sector and integrated assistance approaches in 
consideration of the relatively small scale of the systems involved. 
In the section devoted to the presentation of recent technical 
assistance experiences, the observer for the United Nations Asia 
and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) provided a brief description of a 
collaborative partnership with the Philippines on the revitalization of 
the Volunteer Probation Aides System. The key objective of that 
System was to promote the community involvement in the 
treatment of offenders in accordance with the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (Tokyo 
Rules). The speaker noted that the technical assistance project 
was intended to foster a sense of ownership by the recipient 
country and was premised on the introduction of the corresponding 
Japanese model as good and long-standing practice in that area. 
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The observer for the Norwegian Police Directorate presented the 
lessons learned from a donor country perspective (Norway) on 
technical assistance programming and policing on the occasion of 
a specific project to promote bilateral and multilateral police 
assistance in Serbia. That project was launched in 2002 and 
focused initially on a small police district aiming at building 
capacity, through training to fight financial and narcotics crime, as 
well as improving infrastructure, management skills and crime 
forensics. The project was further expanded to cover all police 
stations in the targeted region and was conducive to the 
identification of general indicators for sustainability and local 
ownership. 
The observer for the United Nations Latin American Institute for 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD) 
presented the experience of the Institute in the field of technical 
assistance on criminal justice and prison reform in Latin America. 
He listed examples of technical assistance programmes channelled 
through the Institute, which managed, despite the limited 
resources, to play a role of a catalytic agent in that field. The 
speaker also stressed the importance of adopting a cross-cutting 
diagnostic approach when assessing the needs to be addressed 
through technical assistance and further favoured the improvement 
of methodologies used for evaluating the impact of technical 
assistance. 
In the discussion following the presentations, questions were 
raised about the limited value of piecemeal technical assistance 
activities that were not integrated into broader reform and capacity 
building initiatives and were not fully endorsed and supported at the 
national level. In that context, the importance of ensuring ownership 
over the quality of the assistance provided in each stage of the 
relevant process and over the results and timeliness of such 
assistance was emphasized. Furthermore, it was suggested that 
further action should be taken towards meeting the particular needs 
of the recipient countries and addressing problems related to the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of technical assistance activities. 
Moreover, the Institutes were encouraged to continue working 
closely with each other, United Nations offices and Member States 
with a view to defining a more systematic strategy and approach to 
ways and means of maximizing the effectiveness of technical 
assistance in future. 
In concluding, the Rapporteur of the Workshop reiterated the 
importance of technical assistance as a main element of any effort 
to effectively address crime prevention and criminal justice issues 
in the context of sustainable development and human security. 
However, he recalled that technical assistance activities are often 
assumed to be ineffective or inadequate and to fail meeting the 
deeper needs of recipient countries. In that connection and building 
upon recent developments at the national, regional and 
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international levels, some of which were presented during the 
Workshop, he stressed that the consensus can be reached on the 
way forward and on the criteria that could be established and 
followed for enhancing the effectiveness of technical assistance. 
He further linked that issue to the general discussion on the 
revitalization of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice, and he pointed out that consideration should be given to 
the perspective of making technical assistance a long-standing item 
in the agenda of the Commission. He also noted that it might be 
appropriate to work towards the “formalization” of the above-
mentioned criteria through the establishment of a set of guidelines 
for planning and implementing technical assistance, as well as for 
measuring its impact and effectiveness. 
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Solutions for the Future?  
Are There Key Components for Effective Assistance? 
 
 
Margaret Shaw 
Director of Analysis & Exchange, ICPC 
 
 
Major shifts in policy areas and academic disciplines do not occur 
very often, but when they do they have a tendency to spill over into 
other areas of work and study and bring about long-term changes 
in approaches and practice. Such a shift appears to have taken 
place in recent years in the field of development aid, and is evident 
internationally in the ways in which technical assistance is now 
being conceived and delivered. In part this has been prompted by 
the failure of aid to bring about desired changes, and in part 
because of the impacts of globalization. The clear paradigm shift in 
the past five or more years is away from bilateral and donor-led 
technical assistance, towards more multi-lateral, co-ordinated, 
country-led and participatory approaches.  
It seems very appropriate to examine the implications of this shift 
for the criminal justice and crime prevention field. The topic of 
maximizing technical assistance is particularly appropriate for the 
Programme Network Institutes, given the long history of many of 
the Institutes of providing technical assistance (TA) and training in 
criminal justice, and increasingly in crime prevention. The kinds of 
activities under this heading have included: 
• supporting strategy development and consensus-building on the 
need for reform; 
• promoting civil society involvement in the preparation, 
implementation, and monitoring of projects; 
• promoting citizen participation in crime prevention; 
• promoting law reform; 
• bringing national laws and criminal justice systems into 
compliance with international standards; and, 
• institutional strengthening and capacity building to bring about 
organizational change. 
 
 
Why Has Technical Assistance Been Ineffective? 
 
The experience of the PNI has been extensive, but not without its 
frustrations. Over ten years ago the need to develop greater 
coordination among donors and organizations delivering technical 
assistance was evident. HEUNI, based on its experience of working 
with countries in Eastern and Central Europe took the initiative in 
1995 of developing a Database on International Projects in Crime 
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Prevention & Criminal Justice in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
following year in 1996 an expert group meeting made 14 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of international TA 
ranging from carrying out a needs assessment and finding out who 
else is working in the area, to monitoring project progress and 
evaluating impact. By 2001, however, the data base established by 
HEUNI was closed because of technological difficulties, low 
motivation to supply or share information, as well as lack of use by 
recipient and donor countries.  
Overall, technical assistance has been neither effective nor 
sustainable for a range of reasons, including insufficient funding 
and resources, the lack of coordination among donors, and the 
fragmentation of initiatives which focus only on parts of the criminal 
justice system, and neglect other areas. Bilateral assistance to a 
country, for example, may have provided police training on dog 
handling or firearms, yet failed to consider the overall structure of 
policing or respond to its need to develop a community problem-
solving capacity. Similarly, assistance in improving correctional 
systems is important, but may be counteracted by an increasing 
flow of prisoners into that system. Account needs to be taken of the 
system as a whole. What is also clear is that the majority of 
technical assistance in this field has traditionally been directed at 
specific elements of the justice system (law reform, policing, courts, 
judicial training, correctional systems), but rarely considered or 
included crime prevention as an equally essential component.  
A second major concern, however, is that much past technical 
assistance has been insensitive to regional or local context. It has 
tended to be donor and ‘expert driven’. This is something which has 
been characteristic of much of the work in crime prevention over 
the past ten or fifteen years, with assumptions that successful 
projects developed in the North can be transferred to those in the 
South. Regional factors can also have a major impact on shaping 
crime patterns and criminal justice and prevention needs. Technical 
assistance has often failed to take account of recipient country 
interests and needs, as well as their capacities. Corruption and 
abuse of assistance has also been a factor. Finally and more 
recently, considerable funding for crime prevention and criminal 
justice training and technical assistance has been diverted to the 
fight against terrorism and international organized crime, trafficking 
and corruption. Yet stable and effective governance, and well-
functioning prevention strategies and criminal justice systems are 
some of the most important components for protecting against such 
problems. 
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An Emerging Consensus on the Way Forward 
 
In the development aid field, a flurry of recent reports and position 
papers bear witness to the evolution of views on the philosophy 
guiding aid provision, and how it should be delivered. They include 
the well articulated positions of the UK Department of International 
Development (DFID), the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2004, 2006), the European Union (2005, 
2006)1, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and the 
Australian Overseas Aid Programme (2006).2 
The Paris Declaration, designed to enable the achievement of 
the Millenium Development Goals set for 2010, sets out a number 
of commitments for donor and recipient countries on how aid 
should be delivered and managed, and sets target indicators for 
measuring those commitments. These include the notion of 
ownership, that partner countries exercise effective leadership over 
their development policies and strategies; the alignment of donor 
support with partner countries’ national development strategies, 
institutions and procedures; the harmonization of action among 
donors so that they are more transparent and collectively effective; 
managing resources and decision-making for results; and, mutual 
accountability, with both donors and partner countries being 
accountable for development results. 
 
 
What does this mean for revitalizing technical assistance in crime 
prevention and criminal justice? 
 
For crime prevention and criminal justice the need for greater 
coordination among donors and providers still remains a major 
priority. Only five years after the closure of the HEUNI database, 
the need to develop better information and data-sharing 
mechanisms, especially on a regional basis is not only evident, but 
perhaps more generally accepted. Sustainability also requires 
undertaking clear assessment of country and system capacities, 
encouraging national plans, and taking a broad view of justice and 
security systems, as well as recognizing the links between poverty 
and development. The recent Round Table for Africa in Abuja, 
Nigeria, organized by UNODC in 2005, has begun the task of 
identifying regional priorities on crime, drugs and security. It 
recognizes the significant links between poverty and justice and 
security reforms and institutional capacity building, and that they 
                                                     
1 European Security Strategy 2003; European Consensus on Development 2005; 
Aid Effectiveness package, adopted March 2006. See paper by Patrick Dölle on 
the European Approach to Aid Effectiveness in this volume for more details. 
2 Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability. A White Paper on the Australian 
Government’s Overseas Aid Program. 2006. Canberra. 
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are closely linked with development, poverty alleviation, human 
rights protection and good governance.3 The European Consensus 
on Development, adopted in December 2005, similarly recognizes 
the strong links between peace and security, and development and 
poverty eradication, as their new approach to aid effectiveness and 
financial framework to support that approach demonstrate.4 
Monitoring and evaluating, often the mantra which receives least 
attention, must become a more integral and essential aspect of 
technical assistance. Evaluations which involve local partners can 
help to promote ownership in a technical assistance programme 
and its long-term life. This can be helped by the establishment of 
realistic objectives for projects, as well as the use of the growing 
range of tool kits, and assessment indicators and benchmarks. 
UNODC’s Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 2006 provides a 
recent example of the expanding range of tools now becoming 
available. Local crime prevention toolkits developed by the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research CSIR in South Africa and UN- 
HABITAT’s Safer Cities programme provide further examples. 
Providing incentives for change is another means of promoting 
sustainability and ownership.  
 
 
So what are the key elements for effective technical assistance? 
 
In essence, therefore, future technical assistance in crime 
prevention and criminal justice should include the following key 
elements: 
• Holistic approaches 
• Country-led programming to stimulate ownership and 
sustainability 
• Region-specific approaches 
• Broad and integrated approaches 
• Human rights based approaches 
• Building on existing strengths 
• Favouring long-term assistance 
• The active participation of civil society 
• Research-based, results focused, evaluated initiative 
 
                                                     
3 UNODC, 2005. Crime and Development in Africa. Research Section. June. 
Vienna: UNODC. 
4 European Consensus on Development December 2005 (and see papers by 
Patrick Dölle and Tor Tanke Holm in this volume). 
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The Way Forward 
 
There appears to be an emerging consensus in a number of fields 
on principles and approaches for more appropriate, effective and 
lasting technical assistance. Recent assistance work on 
transnational organized crime and corruption has helped to focus 
attention on the importance of training and technical assistance in 
the justice and security sectors, and their links with poverty and 
development. The growth and application of Norms and Standards 
on crime prevention and criminal justice, as well as the exponential 
growth of the internet and other technological changes have 
resulted in increased demand for technical assistance, as well as 
making access to information and assistance and exchange much 
easier.  
For the Programme Network Institutes this raises a number of 
important questions about the level of funding for technical 
assistance projects, whether the needs of regions and countries 
should be prioritized, and what should be the focus of projects. It 
challenges the PNI to learn to work together more collaboratively 
and effectively, and to form a new vision for the future. 
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Maximizing the Effectiveness of Technical Assistance 
Provided by Member States in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice 
 
Background Note 
 
 
Margaret Shaw & Yvon Dandurand 
On Behalf of the PNI 
 
 
This workshop has been developed by the Institutes comprising the 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Network 
(PNI) and addresses one of the main themes of the 15th Session of 
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: how to 
maximize the effectiveness of technical assistance in the area of 
crime prevention and criminal justice.1 The workshop addresses a 
range of questions identified globally about the role and 
effectiveness of technical assistance activities in the context of 
institutional development, capacity building, and treaty and 
international standards implementation in the field. In particular, 
questions are increasingly being raised about the limited value of 
piecemeal technical assistance activities that are not integrated into 
broader reform and capacity building initiatives, and are not fully 
endorsed and supported at the national level.  
It is now widely recognized that providing more, or the same, 
kind of assistance will not be sufficient to bring about the wide 
range of changes and reforms required by most justice and security 
systems. There are some fundamental issues with the way that 
much of the technical assistance in the field of criminal justice and 
crime prevention is currently designed and delivered. Receiving 
countries often express concern about assistance that proves to be 
either futile or disruptive of other reforms or capacity building 
initiatives in which they are already engaged. Technical assistance 
(TA) is too often based on very naïve assumptions about how 
organizational change can be effected, and how institutions are 
transformed. Nevertheless, there is no denying that technical 
assistance will continue to be a major means of supporting capacity 
building, the implementation of international treaties, compliance 
with human rights and justice norms and standards, and 
international cooperation in facing various forms of international 
threats.  
In recent years, technical assistance activities in the justice and 
security sectors have become a major focus of programming for 
many multilateral and bilateral agencies. TA has been incorporated 
                                                     
1 The workshop and background note have been organized on behalf of the PNI 
by ICPC and ICCLR&CJP. 
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in the text of recent conventions as a means to support 
international cooperation in their ratification and implementation. 
Development agencies, recognizing the interrelationship between 
sustainable development, security and justice, have been 
increasingly involved in the area, as part of their efforts to promote 
good governance. The technical assistance activities of the 
UNODC and of the PNI have also increased significantly. Some 
best practices have been identified, but most agencies are still 
struggling to apply the lessons they have learned more 
systematically. In all instances, the organizations and agencies 
involved recognize the need to further coordinate and harmonize 
their activities, even if that is easier said than done. 
This workshop encourages participants to contribute to the kind 
of reflections which Member States and multilateral agencies have 
been engaged in for some time, as part of their efforts to maximize 
the effectiveness of development assistance. While the focus of 
crime prevention and criminal justice is somewhat different, most of 
the factors that have impeded the effectiveness of the development 
assistance provided are essentially the same. The short 
presentations that will be made during the workshop to initiate 
further discussion will be based on the experience of jurisdictions 
receiving the assistance and the agencies responsible for 
delivering it. The purpose of the workshop is to help define the way 
forward for all those involved, and to ensure that the limited 
resources that can be devoted to international assistance have the 
most impact.  
Programming activities in the justice and security sector typically 
include: (1) activities to support strategy formation and consensus-
building around the need for reforms and the nature of the changes 
to be promoted; (2) activities to promote the involvement of citizens 
and civil society organizations in the preparation, implementation 
and monitoring of justice projects; (3) activities to promote citizen 
participation in crime prevention; (4) activities to promote law 
reform when required; (5) activities to bring national laws and 
systems in compliance with international standards (and 
conventions); and, (6) institutional strengthening and capacity 
building activities in the justice and public safety sector to bring 
about organizational change, including technical assistance, 
training and other programs to modernize existing structures and 
procedures and assist with the change process, to create 
mechanisms to create statistical databases, to install planning, 
budgeting, and case management systems, and to build the 
necessary infrastructure and information systems.  
All of these activities are important and the sequence in which 
they are undertaken can often impact their effectiveness. A number 
of lessons have been learned in terms of effective programming 
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and assistance within the sector. These lessons must be identified 
and integrated into future programming.2  
The PNI were among the pioneers in that field and have 
accumulated considerable experience. HEUNI, for example, has a 
long history of working to improve international cooperation in crime 
prevention and criminal justice, especially in relation to Central and 
Eastern Europe. It began to collect information in 1991 on the 
hundreds of international projects being undertaken in the region. 
This eventually led in 1995 to the establishment of the HEUNI 
Database on International Projects in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in Central and Eastern Europe (ECOSOC 
resolution 1995/12). This was intended as a pilot project that could 
eventually lead to the establishment of similar and connected 
databases in every region of the world.  
The idea of a database and of compiling the lessons learned on 
an ongoing basis had to be abandoned. HEUNI concluded in 2001 
that the database was not achieving its purpose. There were many 
problems, including low motivation to supply information, an 
apparent unwillingness of various agencies to share information 
about international projects, the limited quality of some of the data 
provided, and the lack of utilization by both recipient countries and 
donors.3 Today, the idea of developing an interagency mechanism 
to share information about ongoing projects and lessons learned is 
once more being advanced, since the need for such information 
sharing not only remains but has become more apparent.  
Ten years ago, based on that information and on the work of an 
expert group4, HEUNI produced a checklist based on 14 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of international 
assistance5: 
 
1. Carry out a needs assessment. 
2. Find out who else is working in the same 
area. 
3. Decide on the purpose of the project. 
4. Consider different strategies for 
accomplishing the project. 
5. Prepare a written project proposal. 
6. Analyze the expected risks and benefits. 
7. Know your partner. 
8. Secure the support of all the relevant 
‘stakeholders’. 
 
9. Allocate responsibility for costs. 
10. Familiarize yourself with the legal system 
and culture in the recipient country. 
11. Start small. 
12. Work according to a realistic timetable 
and cost estimates. 
13. Monitor progress in the project and 
evaluate its impact. 
14. Be patient.  
 
                                                     
2 For example, see: Biebesheimer, C. and J.M. Payne (2001). IDB Experience in 
Justice Reform. Also: CGCED (2000). Challenges of Capacity Development, 
Volume 11, Towards Sustainable Reforms of Caribbean Justice Systems. 
3 A memorandum submitted by HEUNI was included in secretariat document 
E/CN.15/2001/7. 
4 Expert group meeting on Managing international criminal justice projects: How 
to overcome problems in international assistance. May 3-6, 1996, Helsinki. 
5 Matti Joutsen 1996. Managing International Technical Assistance Projects in 
Criminal Justice. Experiences with assistance in the reform of crime prevention 
and criminal justice in Central and Eastern Europe. HEUNI Paper No. 8. Helsinki. 
 22
Other attempts have been made to list the prerequisites to 
success in various areas in which technical assistance is provided. 
In 2004, for instance, a group of expert which met at the Institute 
for Security Studies in Cape Town proposed ten guidelines to be 
considered by the UNODC in providing technical assistance to 
promote the implementation of the universal conventions and 
protocols related to terrorism and other forms of serious crime.6  
The need to implement international norms and standards in 
crime prevention and criminal justice, globalization and rapid 
technological advances, the challenges of transnational organized 
crime, terrorism, and corruption, and the need to coordinate law 
enforcement responses and foster greater international cooperation 
have all increased the demand for assistance. Some of the 
assistance needed is technical, but a lot of it is simply financial. The 
needs for assistance are complex, varied and generally 
interrelated. They cannot be addressed by short-term, piecemeal, 
specialized initiatives that do not take into account the broader 
need for institutional reform, institution building and capacity 
building.  
Globally, it is clear that technical assistance is too often 
ineffective or inadequate, and rarely meets the deeper needs of 
recipient countries. The benefits of good projects are often not 
sustained. It is easy, therefore, to become somewhat cynical or 
perhaps even disillusioned about the value of most technical 
assistance activities. As before, recipient and donor countries, as 
well as international organizations, have identified concerns that 
are easier to name than to resolve. They include: 
• The lack of sufficient resources allocated for technical 
assistance and capacity building in the field of criminal justice 
and crime prevention. 
• The uncoordinated, fragmented and scattered nature of the 
technical assistance provided, with many organizations and 
donor countries still working bilaterally and in relative isolation 
from each other.7  
• The partial failure of existing coordination mechanisms for 
agencies delivering or funding capacity building and technical 
assistance activities. 
• The failure to take into account, in a real participatory way, 
recipient country’s interests and needs, as well as their own 
democratic decision making processes. A lot of the technical 
assistance offered is still determined by the priorities and goals 
                                                     
6 Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in preventing 
and combating terrorism. Report of the Secretary General, Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, Thirteenth session, 11-20 May 2004, Appendix 
1. (E/CN.15/2004/8) 
7 Hebenton, B. & Spencer, J. (2001). Assessing International Assistance in Law 
Enforcement. Themes, Findings and Recommendations from a Case-Study in the 
Republic of Estonia. HEUNI. Publication No.37 Helsinki 
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of assistance providers, rather than those of the recipients. This 
does not help to instil a sense of ownership on the part of 
recipient countries which would help to ensure sustainability. 
There is often a perception that the donors’ own security 
concerns or policy priorities assume priority over the identified 
needs of the recipient country. Internal security concerns in 
recipient countries are not weighed as heavily as international, 
hemispheric, or regional concerns, or even the security 
concerns of powerful neighbours. Further, the assistance is 
generally not offered in a timely manner, and is very rarely 
committed for periods of time sufficient to ensure the success of 
the fundamental reforms that are required. 
• The lack of sensitivity to context. Models developed in one 
country may not be appropriate nor easily transferred to another 
country. The success of many of the models that are promoted 
through technical assistance is in fact predicated on the 
presence of strong and credible institutions, and a substantial 
capacity to effect and manage change. These models are rarely 
transferable directly. The changes that are proposed are not 
always designed to build on the existing strengths of recipient 
institutions.  
• The neglect of some areas. Efforts by the international 
community to promote international cooperation in the fight 
against various forms of transnational crime, terrorism and 
corruption may have led many agencies to focus too much of 
their technical assistance programmes in those areas. As a 
result, other areas appear to have been neglected, and support 
for longer-term assistance to meet national needs has been 
more difficult to obtain. Current programmes often fail to 
embrace a more comprehensive, integrated approach to 
technical assistance. Such an approach is necessary to support 
national strategies to strengthen institutional and operational 
capacities of countries in need. Specialized forms of technical 
assistance are sometimes better funded than others, yet it must 
be recognized that a basic, functioning and credible justice 
system must be in place before specialized interventions are 
undertaken.  
• In recent years, the efforts of development agencies have been 
increasingly directed toward the reform of the justice and 
security sectors. These initiatives have been designed to 
develop the capacity of "partner countries" to address security 
issues in the post 9/11 world and to meet the challenges of the 
globalization of crime and corruption. There are concerns, 
however, that development assistance is being diverted to the 
fight against terrorism and other transnational security threats, 
to the detriment of projects designed to reform systems of 
governance, and to build institutional and community capacity 
for civil society. 
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• Technical assistance has tended to focus on different parts of 
the justice system or on specific areas (e.g. police firearms 
training) without taking into account the sector as a whole or 
broader factors impinging on the justice system’s overall 
effectiveness. For example, technical assistance in the justice 
sector has focused primarily on strengthening the different 
sectors of the criminal justice system (legislation, policing, 
courts, prisons) but more rarely considered their 
interdependence.8 Even more rarely, has much attention been 
given to reducing the supply of offenders and victims by putting 
in place comprehensive strategies and programmes to prevent 
crime and victimization from taking place.9  
• Technical assistance, whether directed to transnational 
organized crime and corruption or criminal justice and crime 
prevention, often fails to take into account the capacity of 
recipient countries, or systems, or the importance of good 
governance to implement or benefit from training or new 
technologies.10 Adopting a new legislative structure or prison 
protocols will have little impact if countries do not have the 
necessary capacities to manage, train and maintain such 
innovative systems. In Africa, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) has identified a lack of capacity as a 
major constraint for sustainable development. Corruption and 
abuse among the police and/or government officials, ethnic and 
cultural factors, and social and economic disparities, the lack of 
infrastructure and basic resources, all make decisions on when 
and how to develop TA very important.  
 
There are a number of strategies that may be utilized to increase 
the efficacy of locally-owned crime prevention and justice and 
security reforms. These include:  
 
• Establishing the legitimacy of the proposed reform. If an 
initiative is identified as being solely the initiative of an outside 
agency or government, it is unlikely to be legitimized and will not 
be sustainable. Rather, the reform will be viewed as externally 
imposed and as a pre-requisite for receiving other types of 
assistance. It is important that the recipient country have 
“ownership” of the reform effort. The recipient country should 
                                                     
8 Herman, T. 2001. Aspects in International Technical Cooperation – Lessons 
Learned. International Cooperation Group, Department of Justice Canada. Paper 
given at HEUNI International Seminar on Central Issues in Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice, Helsinki, December 14-15th. 
9 Shaw, M. 2005. Why crime prevention is an essential component of 
international training and technical assistance: the experience of the International 
Centre for the Prevention of Crime. Paper given at the Annual Meetings of the 
American Society of Criminology, Toronto November 16-19th. 
10 Dandurand, Y. Griffiths, C. T. & V. Chin 2004. Justice and Security Sector 
Reform and Development. Discussion Note - Americas Branch. Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA). Gatineau, Canada.  
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play the primary role in identifying and prioritizing the areas in 
need of reform. Furthermore, because changes in one part of 
the system will invariably affect other parts of the system, 
reforms that are seen as the initiative of only one agency within 
the system are not likely to receive the support they require in 
order to succeed. This presents unique challenges to both the 
donor and recipient countries. 
• Finding champions. Countries providing assistance are well 
advised to consult with a wide range of informants in the 
recipient country in an effort to distinguish between those 
persons who are “figureheads” from those who are committed to 
reform and have the requisite influence and authority to 
enhance the reform process. Investing sufficient time and 
resources in identifying these people will increase the likelihood 
of success of the reform initiative.  
• Providing incentives for change. Reform is a difficult task in 
all systems, due in large measure to the tendency of agency 
personnel to resist change, to be unwilling to put their position 
and status at risk or to challenge the status quo. There must be 
some incentives for senior personnel and individuals at the 
managerial and line levels to participate in the reform effort. It is 
not realistic to assume that there will be enthusiastic support for 
an initiative merely because it is labelled as “reform.”  
• Establishing realistic benchmarks and reform objectives. 
Even the best-designed assistance project will fall short of its 
objectives if it is not planned adequately. It is unrealistic to 
expect that all of the required reforms will occur simultaneously, 
or that a system’s institutional and human resource capacity can 
be developed overnight. Specific, achievable objectives must be 
established that hold the best potential for success. 
Demonstration projects and carefully selected and developed 
case studies can provide early, visible successes that will 
increase the momentum of, and support for, organizational 
change and reform.  
• Conducting project evaluations. All assistance projects in the 
field of justice and security should include an evaluation 
component. Independent researchers from the jurisdiction in 
question should conduct this evaluation, working where 
required, in collaboration with evaluators from the country 
providing the technical assistance. There are a number of key 
issues surrounding project evaluation, including the use of an 
evaluative framework that is not externally-imposed but rather 
reflects the realities of the recipient country. Further, if the 
measures of success are too rigid, then reform initiatives may 
be inappropriately determined to have failed. 
 
Over the past decade, with the accumulated experience of 
participants, new approaches to the provision of TA are emerging. 
The different contexts and needs of countries in development, 
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transition, and post-conflict are now more explicitly recognized. 
There is much greater emphasis on the importance of the views 
and needs of recipient countries, on the importance of multilateral 
collaboration, on the need for system-wide approaches, on the 
benefits of balancing criminal justice and crime prevention 
strategies. There is a greater recognition of how justice and 
security reforms and institutional capacity building are interlinked 
with development, poverty alleviation, human rights protection and 
the promotion of good governance.11 Models which incorporate 
these elements are being developed and hold some important 
promises for the future of criminal justice institutions.  
For instance, the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) has been among the leaders in recognizing the need for 
donor countries to approach the question differently and built on 
some of the most important lessons that have already been learned 
in this field. It has adopted a set of principles for aid effectiveness 
relating to country ownership over the reform initiatives, alignment 
with national poverty reduction strategies, delivery of assistance 
through effective institutions, results-based focus, allocation of 
assistance to the poorest, harmonization of initiatives amongst 
donors, and sector-wide approaches.12 
DFID also emphasizes the strong links between security and 
development.13 On the basis of lessons learned from security, 
justice and development projects in a range of countries in Africa, 
the Caribbean, and South East Asia, recommendations for future 
work in this area include the need to combine short-term work on 
community safety with longer-term organizational change; the 
importance of working to ensure full partnership between 
government and civil society, reducing the exclusive focus on the 
justice and security sector itself; the importance of linking such 
programmes to poverty reduction in recognition of exclusion and 
inequalities of treatment and security; and the need to ensure that 
gender is mainstreamed, and not restricted to individual projects.14 
For DFID, the principle of country-led approaches is crucial, but it 
makes clear that it does not equate country ownership with 
government ownership. Civil society is also included in the notion of 
country ownership. They should have a voice and stake in their 
development, including the poorest groups, while government 
should also be accountable to them. 
                                                     
11 UNODC 2005b. Crime and Development in Africa. Research Section. June. 
Vienna: UNODC. Stone, C. & Miller, J. Thornton, M. & Trone, J. (2005). 
Supporting Security, Justice and Development: Lessons for a New Era. Report 
for UK DFID. New York: Vera Institute of Justice. 
12 www.dfid.gov.uk  
13 Fighting poverty to build a safer world. A strategy for security and development. 
Department for International Development. March 2005. London. 
14 Stone, C. & Miller, J. Thornton, M. & Trone, J. (2005). Supporting Security, 
Justice and Development: Lessons for a New Era. Report for UK DFID. New 
York: Vera Institute of Justice. 
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In Canada, the strategy of the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) stresses similar approaches, with a 
focus on governance, human rights, people-centred, civil society 
involvement, and locally owned activities, community-based 
approaches, multi-sectoral strategies, integrated sector-wide 
approaches, partnerships, regional and sub-regional approaches, 
and ‘whole-of-government’ approaches. 15  
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has also worked to revitalize development aid.16 It sees 
capacity development as a broader concept than technical 
assistance, and more extensive than capacity building, which has 
been associated with the more limited area of technical cooperation 
and training. Capacity development has been defined as the ability 
of people and organizations to define and achieve their objectives, 
and an important distinction is made between developing the 
capacity of the enabling environment – the structures of power and 
influence and institutions, at the organizational level – in terms of 
the quality of those organizations, and at the individual level – in 
terms of the knowledge and skills of individuals who work in those 
organizations.17  
The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 18 of the High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was concerned with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and sets out the ways in 
which donor countries should deliver and manage aid to increase 
its impact in reducing poverty and inequality, increase growth, build 
capacity and accelerate the achievement of the MDGs. The 
Declaration outlines a series of five partnership commitments, 
based on the lessons of experience, concerning ownership, 
alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. These 
are designed to increase the effectiveness of aid and adapt to 
different country situations. They include twelve specific indicators 
to spur progress, with a timetable and targets, and stress the 
importance of monitoring and evaluating implementation. Capacity 
development is seen as a major objective of national development 
and poverty-reduction.19 
                                                     
15 CIDA 2004. Sustainable Development Strategy: 2004-2006. Canadian 
International Development Agency. Gatineau, Canada. Dandurand, Y., Griffiths, 
C. T. & Chin, V. 2004. Towards a Programming Framework for Development 
Assistance in the Justice and Security Sector. Discussion Note - Americas 
Branch. Gatineau, Canada: Canadian International Development Agency. 
16 OECD 2004. Policy brief – Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and 
Good Practice. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
www.oecd.org  
17 The Challenge of Capacity development: Working Towards Good Practice. 
Development Assistance Committee, OECD. February 2006. Paris: Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
18 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness High Level Forum, Paris 28th February – 
2nd March 2005. www.oecd.org  
19 The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice. 
Development Assistance Committee, OECD. February 2006. OECD: Paris. 
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Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 - Partnership Commitments 
Partnership 
Commitments 
Description No. of 
Target 
Indicators 
for 2010 
Ownership Partner countries exercise effective 
leadership over their development policies, 
and strategies and co-ordinate 
development actions 
1 
Alignment Donors base their overall support on partner 
countries’ national development strategies, 
institutions and procedures 
2-8 
Harmonization Donors’ actions are more harmonized, 
transparent and collectively effective 
9-10 
Managing for 
results 
Managing resources and improving 
decision-making for results 
11 
Mutual 
accountability 
Donors and partners are accountable for 
development results 
12 
 
The European Union has similarly developed a model which 
endorses the Paris Declaration. It emphasizes the three ‘C’s of 
coordination, complementarity and coherence. It is committed to a 
partnership approach with countries, capacity building through 
coordinated programmes, an increasing use of multi-donors, 
channelling assistance through country systems, avoiding the 
establishment of new ‘implementation units’, and reducing 
uncoordinated missions. 20 In terms of safety and security, there is 
an emphasis on conflict prevention, peace-building and long-term 
development.  
Multilateral agencies often privilege regional approaches to 
security and justice reform, even when assistance is provided in 
support of a national reform program. The OECD suggests that the 
common security needs faced by a region should be identified. 
There are many reasons why such an approach is recommended 
including: (1) security challenges often involve cross border 
(transnational) issues, they are part of a “regional security 
complex”; (2) it can be helpful and more effective to have collective 
responses to security issues; (3) unaddressed security issues can 
lead to conflict within the region, and weak points that can be 
exploited by criminal elements and others; and, (4) the need for 
capacity development is often better addressed by initiatives at the 
regional and sub-regional levels, particularly when regional 
programming can produce economies of scale and a greater 
harmonization between security systems that will invariably be 
called upon to cooperate in defending the region against outside 
security threats.  
There are also some potential disadvantages to regional 
approaches to assistance for security system reform (SSR). Some 
                                                     
20 EuropeAid. Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: The Why, 
What and How? 2005. Brussels: European Commission. 
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observers21 have cautioned that a regional approach may: (1) 
encourage inappropriate regional generalizations; (2) be based on 
inadequate analysis of specific national challenges, strengths, 
needs and opportunities; (3) encounter some national resistance 
based on regional politics; and, (4) introduce a bias in the 
identification of priorities for action, and entail significant 
opportunity costs for specific national programs. Greene has also 
concluded “there may be real advantages to developing regional 
approaches and perspectives to SSR strategies and assistance, so 
long as this does not detract unduly from the need for specific 
national analysis and programming, and that opportunities are also 
pursued to develop thematic or sectoral strategies and programs”.  
It is evident that regional approaches, if they are to be more than 
a collection of disparate projects at the national level, require 
careful planning and meticulous design, as well as a strong 
executing agency. The pre-conditions for success, including the 
required political commitment to the objectives of the reform, are 
often hard to maintain over time and across the region.  
A regional focus which responds to specific needs and context, 
and recognizes the links between development and crime, has 
been strongly supported by the Round Table for Africa which 
endorsed the programme for action on crime, drugs and security in 
September 2005.22 The Round Table, hosted by the Government of 
Nigeria and organized by UNODC, has set out key priorities in the 
areas of rule of law and criminal justice reform, conventional 
crimes, illicit trafficking, organized crime, corruption, money-
laundering and terrorism, drug abuse and HIV/AIDS, ratification 
and implementation of conventions, and data collection, analysis, 
dissemination and publication. Many of the proposed actions will 
entail enhanced technical cooperation and capacity-building, the 
development of indicators, and the construction of computerized 
databases, specific to the needs of the region. They recognize the 
impact of poverty, small arms, and HIV/AIDS and conflict on the 
region, the importance of taking account of existing capacities and 
resources. The plan of action sets out a five year framework for 
technical cooperation to reduce the impact of crime and drugs as 
impediments to security and development. One suggestion by 
NAUSS (Naif Arab University for Security Sciences) for the Arab 
region is the development of implementation assistance module 
programmes, and online computerized legal databases on national 
legislation and casework assistance systems, which could be 
beneficial for assisting Member States with the implementation of 
international instruments. 
 
                                                     
21 Greene, O. (2003). “Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional 
Perspectives”, p. 8. 
22 Crime and Drugs as Impediments to Security and Development in Africa. A 
Programme for Action 2006-2010. Abuja 5-6 September 2005. UNODC 2005 
Crime and Development in Africa. Research Section. June. Vienna: UNODC. 
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Revitalizing Technical Assistance and Maximizing its Effectiveness  
 
What are the implications for ‘revitalizing’ technical assistance in 
crime prevention and criminal justice and maximizing its 
effectiveness? Is the time right for re-launching databases and 
information sharing? Can duplication give way to coordination? 
What are the components for effective capacity building or capacity 
development? Should there be greater emphasis on system 
capacity and organizational capacity as well as individual capacity? 
What does it mean to place technical assistance within the broader 
framework of a human rights-based approach?  
Some of the following considerations seem to be evident:  
• Greater coordination among donors and providers, including 
the PNI, and the need to facilitate ‘consortia’ among donors.. 
(This includes recognition that organizations operate on 
different agendas and principles. Some must remain 
independent of States’ political and economic agendas).  
• Undertaking a clear assessment of the capacity of a country 
and of its system components, before TA is developed, and 
possibly identifying some of the minimum capacities required. 
This is also crucial for helping to ensure sustainability so that 
projects and technical expertise gained are continued and 
utilized at the end of training and technical assistance 
interventions.  
• Countries requesting assistance may be encouraged to develop 
national plans for justice and security reforms, based on local 
consultation and local consensus. 
• There is need for some agreed principles and benchmarks for 
monitoring and evaluating the impact and effectiveness of 
technical assistance itself.  
• Developing assistance based on a broad view of the 
components of justice and security systems, including their links 
to poverty and development and the role of good governance.  
• The development and sharing of better information and data 
sources, the utilization of good practice. It is probable that there 
is now greater willingness to share information and develop 
databanks than was the case ten years ago.  
 
 
Key Elements of a TA Revitalization Strategy 
 
The following elements should inspire the UN Crime Commission’s 
strategy to revitalize technical assistance in crime prevention and 
criminal justice:  
• Holistic approaches: The need to support comprehensive 
approaches to strengthen the justice sector as a whole, 
including increasing the overall capacity of justice institutions, 
increasing their public credibility, and curbing corruption. 
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Integrated approaches do not necessarily preclude the 
possibility that an intervention may be targeted at an individual 
security agency, at a single process within that agency (e.g. an 
information management system for the courts), or may address 
more general security issues across the system as a whole. It 
does not matter what strategy is used, as long as the assistance 
program is carefully planned, even sequentially, as part of a 
broader strategy to enhance the capacity of the system as a 
whole and its governance. Effective coordination horizontally, 
across the system, remains one of the essential preconditions 
to the success of any such initiative.  
• Country-led programming: Interventions which will help to 
stimulate country ownership and sustainability. This includes not 
only government, but NGO’s and civil society. There should also 
be coordination or harmonization between donors and 
organizations and partnership governments. 
• Region-specific: The development of technical assistance 
approaches, data, techniques and aids which are tailored or 
adapted to the specific needs of regions or sub-regions. This 
has been stressed in particular in relation to the African Region 
(e.g. by UNAFRI and NAUSS).  
• Broad and integrated: Comprehensive strategies which include 
all the components of crime prevention and the criminal justice 
system as an interrelated system, and related to national 
strategies and plans.  
• Human rights based: The recognition of inequalities in safety 
and security, and the exclusion of minorities, women, youth and 
the most disadvantaged groups. Donors must reaffirm their 
commitment to support security reforms only in ways that are 
consistent with democratic principles and human rights 
standards. This must ensure that all technical and other 
assistance is provided in a manner that is consistent with 
applicable human rights standards. There exists a large body of 
human rights and criminal justice standards that are directly 
relevant to programming in the justice and security sectors. 
Programmes should be designed and reviewed by people who 
are thoroughly familiar with these standards and norms, and 
recognize their relevance to the proposed reforms. 
• Building on existing strengths: The programming must also 
build, as much as possible, on the existing strengths of the local 
system. Support must be offered in a manner that makes it 
relevant to local agendas and timeframes. The planning cycle of 
donors may be either too slow, or not coincide sufficiently with 
the policy planning and implementation cycle of the requesting 
country, and opportunities for excellent programming and key 
strategic support interventions that would have an appreciable 
impact are often missed. The disruption or interruption of 
assistance during, or between, projects may also undermine the 
potential effectiveness of reform initiatives.  
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• Favouring long-term assistance: Most of the problems faced 
by developing countries in relation to their justice and security 
sectors are not amenable to short-term interventions, but 
require changes in culture and attitudes that can only occur over 
long periods of time. They require human resources and 
institutional capacity development that would take years, if not 
decades, to accomplish even in well-developed and prosperous 
countries. Improvements in capacity, quality, and effectiveness, 
when achieved, will tend to be slow in developing. Capacity 
development projects, as a rule, usually require a “longer-term 
commitment than traditional projects”.23 Security sector reform 
must therefore be viewed as a long-term process that requires 
persistence over time.24 The nature and extent of a country’s 
progress, many have observed, “is shaped and conditioned by 
the pace of social and political change, rather than abstract 
donor timetables”.25  
• Participation of civil society: This requires the active 
participation of civil society, not just consultation. Enabling civil 
society to organize, advocate, effect, and influence change in all 
aspects of governance is essential to sustainable development. 
In the field of security reform, the involvement of civil society is 
an absolute prerequisite to enhanced human security and 
ongoing respect for human rights and democratic principles. 
Programming in the justice and security sectors must support 
the efforts of civil society to create a “pro-reform environment for 
democratic governance of the security system”.26 
• Research-based, results-focused, monitoring and 
evaluation. This includes more varied data collection, adapted 
to local capacities, disaggregated data, the establishment of 
benchmarks and indicators, and target dates.  
 
These principles need to be applied to all stages of technical 
assistance development and delivery, from assessing needs and 
capacities in collaboration with partner countries, to integrating and 
exchanging knowledge, and monitoring and evaluating outcomes. 
In terms of evaluation and assessment of technical assistance, 
experience has made it very clear that projects vary in terms of 
their expected outcomes. Some will have immediate outcomes, and 
short-term impacts, but these may not always persist over time. In 
other cases the impact of projects may take time to become 
evident. It would seem important to have follow-up resources to 
track the longer-term outcomes, and to build a better knowledge-
                                                     
23 CIDA (2001). Capacity Development Guide for Program Managers, p. 3 
24 See: Biebesheimer, C. and J.M. Payne (2001). IDB Experience in Justice 
Reform, p. 1. 
25 Ball, N. (2002). Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual 
Framework for UNDP. 
26 OECD (2004). Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good 
Practice.  
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base about the real impacts of different types of technical 
assistance and in different contexts. 
An important tool which will facilitate the targeting and 
effectiveness of technical assistance is the Criminal Justice 
Assessment Toolkit being developed by the Criminal Justice 
Reform Unit of UNODC.27 Its purpose is to standardize the 
assessment of criminal justice needs and existing capacities across 
countries and regions, covering all aspects of justice systems, as 
well as ensuring ‘that the UN Standards and Norms on crime 
prevention and criminal justice are integrated more fully into 
technical assistance interventions’. An important aspect of the 
project is that it is being developed in consultation with other UN 
agencies involved in the rule of law and governance issues.  
 
 
Recent Experience 
 
Recent examples of technical assistance illustrate some of these 
key principles. 
• UNAFEI’s case study of a collaborative partnership with the 
Philippines on the revitalization of the Volunteer Probation Aides 
System. 
• UNAFRI’s experience in providing technical assistance to 
Member States in the African Region  
• Lessons learned from a donor country perspective (Norway) on 
technical assistance on policing in Serbia and Montenegro. 
• ILANUD’s experience of technical assistance on criminal justice 
and prison reform in Latin America, in collaboration with RWI 
and UNAFEI. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There seems to be an emerging consensus in a number of fields on 
the kinds of principles and approaches which can help make 
technical assistance more appropriate, effective and lasting. 
Concern with transnational organized crime and corruption, and 
terrorism have helped to focus attention on the importance of 
training and technical assistance in the justice and security sectors 
and their role in development.28 Similarly, norms and standards, 
globalization, and technological change have increased demand 
for technical assistance and training, made access easier, and for  
                                                     
27 This is being developed by the Criminal Justice Reform Unit, Rule of Law 
Section, Human Security Branch, UNODC. 
28 Dandurand, Y. Griffiths, C. T. & V. Chin (2004). Justice and Security Sector 
Reform and Development. Discussion Note - Americas Branch. Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA). Gatineau, Canada. 
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the future, they offer some very innovative opportunities for 
interacting in the delivery of TA and developing and building 
capacity.  
Examples of recent models (country and regional), and specific 
examples of the work of some of the Institutes, as well as donor 
and recipient views, are presented in the workshop. The examples 
take an integrative and participatory approach, assess systems 
overall as well as basic capacities, illustrating and comparing how 
issues were tackled and solutions developed, and illustrate some of 
the key principles outlined above. The workshop is intended to 
stimulate a lively and interactive exchange.  
There is broad agreement among the PNI on these key 
themes, and a commitment to work cooperatively to strengthen the 
effectiveness of the technical assistance offered by the Institutes in 
collaboration with the UN Crime Commission for the future. Yet a 
number of important questions remain. What should be the level of 
funding for technical assistance? What should be the focus of 
projects? Should there be priorities to particular countries and 
regions? There has been fragmentation in terms of technical 
assistance between UN bodies. There has been fragmentation 
between the Institutes themselves. What should be the vision for 
the future?  
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The European Union (EU) as the world’s biggest aid donor is very 
keen to improve aid effectiveness in general, and in particular the 
effectiveness of its own aid to recipient countries and organisations, 
as it has often been criticised in the past by beneficiaries and other 
donors for its alleged lack of coordination and effectiveness in this 
field.  
The EU is, therefore, one of the driving forces behind the 
international reform process which was set in motion at the 
conference held in Monterrey from 18 to 22 March 20022 and which 
has culminated so far in the famous "Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness" adopted at the High Level Forum on 2 March 2005 
by over one hundred countries and organisations.3  
As this reform process eventually aims to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), the EU approach to aid effectiveness 
covers all sectors of aid and not specifically the area of crime 
prevention and criminal justice. However, it goes without saying 
that all the elements of the EU approach are very relevant to this 
specific area. Furthermore, the issue of crime is receiving ever-
growing attention in the external relations of the EU, including with 
regard to external aid. 
 
 
EU Principles and Commitments on Aid Effectiveness 
 
The year 2005 was a cornerstone for EU development policy, as 
the Paris Declaration, which has become the international 
reference point for the work on aid effectiveness, paved the way for 
the so-called "European Consensus on Development",4 jointly 
adopted on 20 December 2005 by the Council of the EU, its 
Member States, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament following a communication of the European 
                                                     
1 This paper deals with aid effectiveness issues in the EU and should be read in 
conjunction with the paper on the EU financial framework by the same author. It 
should be noted that the paper reflects the views of the author and not 
necessarily the position of the European Commission.  
2 UN doc. No° A/CONF.198/11. 
3 The Paris Declaration of March 2005 is available on the OECD website: 
www.oecd.org  
4 Official Journal of the EU, C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1. 
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Commission.5 This “European Consensus” reflects the willingness 
of the EU to make a decisive contribution to the eradication of 
poverty and to help build a more peaceful and equitable world. 
Building on the achievements under the UN and the OECD, in 
particular the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, it sets the 
principles of a common vision and a common implementation 
policy.  
The "European Consensus" therefore fully endorses the five 
Partnership Commitments laid down in the Paris Declaration: 
• Ownership: donors commit to respect partner country leadership 
and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it. 
• Alignment: donors base their overall support on partner 
countries' national development strategies, institutions and 
procedures. 
• Harmonisation: donors commit to make their actions more 
harmonised, transparent and collectively effective, notably via 
complementarity, common arrangements and simplified 
procedures. 
• Managing for results: donors commit to link country 
programming and resources to results, and to rely, as far as 
possible, on partner countries' results-oriented reporting and 
monitoring frameworks. 
• Mutual accountability: donors commit to provide timely, 
transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows, and to 
jointly assess with partner countries the mutual progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness. 
 
Furthermore, at the time of the adoption of the Paris Declaration 
the EU imposed on itself more rigorous standards than other 
donors, by fixing concrete targets known as the “four additional 
commitments”: 
• to provide all capacity-building assistance through coordinated 
programmes with an increasing use of multi-donor 
arrangements; 
• to channel 50% of government-to-government assistance 
through country systems, including by increasing the 
percentage of EU assistance provided through budget support 
or sector wide approach (SWAP) arrangements; 
• to avoid the establishment of any new "project implementation 
units"; 
• to reduce the number of un-coordinated missions by 50%. 
 
                                                     
5 Communication of 13 July 2005 of the European Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
Regions: Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European 
Parliament and the Commission on the EU Development Policy, "The European 
Consensus", COM(2005) 311 final. 
 37
In order to implement the ambitious commitments of the Paris 
Declaration and the European Consensus for Development, the 
European Commission adopted on 2 March 2006 the so-called “Aid 
effectiveness package”. This package consists of three distinct but 
interlinked communications: 
• “EU Aid: Delivering more, better and faster”;6 
• “Financing for Development and Aid effectiveness – The 
challenge of scaling up EU aid 2006-2010”;7 
• “Increasing the Impact of EU Aid: a common framework for 
drafting strategy papers and joint multi-annual programming”.8 
 
The “Aid effectiveness package” was discussed on 10/11 April 
2006 by the Council, who agreed on some further concrete 
measures to be envisaged by the EU with a view to stepping up aid 
effectiveness.9 
First and foremost, the Council noted the progress made by the 
EU with regard to the scaling up of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), and set the new concrete targets of ODA increases, with 
the EU collectively providing 0.56% of its GNI by 2010, as an 
intermediate step to achieving the UN target of 0.7% by 2015. With 
its increase in aid volume, the EU currently contributes about 80% 
of the promised scaling up of ODA worldwide, providing collectively 
at least 50% of this increase to Africa. This scaling up of aid does 
of course require even more to improve aid effectiveness. 
As suggested by the European Commission and approved by 
the Council, a milestone for greater effectiveness would be a joint 
programming framework aligned with partner countries' strategies, 
where the European Commission together with partner countries, 
interested EU Member States and all other interested donors, in 
particular from the UN, would carry out joint multi-annual 
programming. According to the Council, such joint programming 
should follow a two-step approach: first a common needs analysis, 
and second the establishment of a common response strategy. The 
Council conclusions propose in their appendix a format for a 
detailed Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers 
(CFCSP), on the basis of which the joint analysis for the country 
strategy should be carried out. 
Furthermore, the Council invited the European Commission to 
come up, before the end of 2006 with proposals on concrete 
operational principles on how to organise the division of labour 
between the European Commission and EU Member States better, 
                                                     
6 COM(2006) 87 final. 
7 COM(2006) 85 final. 
8 COM(2006) 88 final. 
9 The Council conclusions are available on the following website:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/8921
9.pdf  
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taking into account their respective competencies and comparative 
advantages based on presence, resources, experiences and roles 
developed in the field, as well as modalities such as lead donors or 
delegated cooperation. It goes without saying that the EU 
endeavours to enhance complementarity also with all other donors, 
and to strengthen the principle of a lead donor, which may of 
course mean that the EU may leave the lead to other donors and 
participate through so-called “silent contributions”. 
To achieve these aims, the EU is currently revising its 
procedures and in particular its rules on co-financing, with a view to 
facilitating joint financing arrangements.10 
Finally, the Council analysed some more specific measures 
envisaged, or already accomplished, by the European Commission, 
and which complement the above initiatives aiming for better 
coherence, coordination and complementarity. These include the 
revision of the EU Donor Atlas, the adoption of roadmaps, the 
establishment of a network of development research centres and 
the multiplication of joint training for development practitioners. As 
stated in the aforementioned Commission communication on "EU 
Aid: Delivering more, better and faster", the implementation of the 
commitments taken by the EU with regard to aid effectiveness will 
be closely monitored and evaluated before 2008. 
 
 
EU Aid Effectiveness and the Area of Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice 
 
While EU external aid traditionally focused on issues which are 
often also root causes of crime such as poverty, hunger and social 
exclusion, the area of crime prevention and criminal justice was 
until recently not targeted as such by EU aid. This rather traditional 
approach started to evolve when, also due to a persistent lack of 
any sustainable impact of decades of aid delivery, the principles of 
good governance and rule of law became very prominent issues to 
be tackled in the partner countries. However, EU aid programmes 
and projects in this field mainly addressed the complexities of 
public financial management, economic governance or the whole 
legal and justice system, but did not specifically target the area of 
prevention and the fight against crime.  
In this respect, the increasing political role of the EU on the 
international scene, its recognition that persistent conflicts 
throughout the world continuously hamper many of its efforts in the 
                                                     
10 The new EU external aid instruments to be adopted for the EC budget period 
2007-2013 and the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) will foresee more 
flexible procedures with regard to co-financing with Member States and other 
donors (see also the paper on the article "The EU framework for financial 
mobilisation" by the same author).  
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field of development, but also the ever-growing security concerns of 
its citizens, led to a major shift in paradigm in recent years, which 
has culminated so far in the European Security Strategy adopted 
by the European Council on 12 December 2003.11 Under the motto 
of "a secure Europe in a better world", the European Security 
Strategy analyses the role of the EU with regard to global security. 
It explicitly recognises security as a precondition for development 
and identifies organised crime, terrorism and state failure among 
the key threats to the European and global security. The nexus 
between security and development was further elaborated by the 
abovementioned "European Consensus on Development", which 
states that "without peace and security development and poverty 
eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty 
eradication no sustainable peace will occur". 
In this new context, the area of crime prevention and criminal 
justice has naturally attracted increasing attention of the EU when it 
comes to external relations and external aid, as exemplified by 
several recent initiatives where the European Commission has 
been the initiator or has at least been actively involved.  
Following a Commission communication of 12 October 2005,12 
the Council of the EU adopted in December 2005 a "Strategy for 
the External Dimension of the EU's area on freedom, security and 
justice".13 This Strategy calls the EU to use its role as a global 
player better by strengthening its partnerships with third countries 
to cover the full range of issues related to security and justice, and 
to mobilise its significant political, financial and operational 
resources to tackle problems in this field at source through actions 
to build capacity in partner countries. The necessary funding for 
priorities in the area of security and justice will in particular have to 
be provided under the new EU external aid instruments. For the 
sake of increased aid effectiveness, the EU Member States and the 
European Commission are requested to ensure full coherence, 
coordination and complementarity of their activities and assistance 
programmes in this field. 
While these requirements are identical to those of EU external 
aid in general, the EU has also participated to the recent 
development of a more specific approach with regard to security 
and justice issues, which puts the emphasis in particular on greater 
effectiveness of aid. Under the aegis of the OECD and its 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the international donor 
community has elaborated a new concept called “Security Sector 
                                                     
11 The European Security Strategy is available on the website of the Council: 
www.consilium.europa.eu 
12 COM(2005) 491 final. 
13 Council conclusions of 1 and 5 December 2005. The Council conclusions and 
the Strategy are available on the website of the Council: www.consilium. europa. 
eu  
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Reform” (SSR),14 whose principles were laid down for the first time 
on 16 April 2004 at a DAC ministerial meeting.15 Albeit not as such 
a new area of engagement of the EU and the wider donor 
community, SSR takes a more holistic approach to security in 
seeking to increase partner countries’ capacity in all sectors related 
to security, in the sense of a reform of both the bodies which 
provide security to citizens, as well as the institutions responsible 
for management and oversight of those bodies. With regard to 
technical assistance in the field of crime prevention and criminal 
justice, this means that a needs analysis has of course to take into 
account the whole context of the security system, and to be 
embedded as much as possible in a comprehensive and coherent 
policy of the partner countries.  
The EU continues to be active at OECD level, where practical 
SSR implementation guidelines are currently being developed for 
adoption in 2007, but in the meantime it has also adopted its own 
specific concepts in this field. First the Council approved in 
November 2005, in the framework of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) under title V of the EU Treaty, the so-called 
"EU concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform",16 and 
subsequently the European Commission adopted on 24 May 2006 
its communication on "a concept for European Community Support 
for Security Sector Reform".17 Together these documents form the 
overall EU approach in the field of SSR, by complementing the 
legal bases, powers and resources available under the relevant 
parts of the EU Treaty.18 The coming years will be used by the EU 
to implement the SSR concept on the ground in the framework of 
its development assistance and its ever-growing ESDP missions in 
the field of military and civilian crisis management. 
In this respect, the challenge of recruiting the right expertise for 
technical assistance in the very sensitive area of security, 
comprising crime prevention and criminal justice, will be crucial for 
increasing aid effectiveness. The EU has started to develop new 
rules and tools facilitating the provision and recruitment of experts 
in accordance with the principle of ownership. The European 
                                                     
14 This concept is often also referred to as "Security System Reform", which 
better reflects the multi-sector nature of the security system. 
15 See the OECD website : www.oecd.org/dac/conflict  
16 Council conclusions of 21-22 November 2005, which are available on the 
website of the Council: www.consilium.europa.eu 
17 COM(2006) 253 final. 
18 The Treaty establishing the European Community (EC), which nowadays 
corresponds to title II of the EU Treaty and is also referred to as the "first pillar", 
establishes EC competence in the field of development cooperation (art. 177 ff.), 
with wide powers and resources conferred to the European Commission. The 
ESDP belongs to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established 
under title V of the EU Treaty, which is also referred to as the "second pillar". Its 
mainly intergovernmental approach confers large powers to the Council and the 
EU Member States, with in parallel a reduced role of the European Commission 
and the other EC institutions. 
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Commission has in particular developed with the EU Member 
States the so-called “twinning procedure”, which was first applied to 
the countries which had applied for accession to the EU (PHARE 
programme), this has in the meantime been extended to the 
Western Balkans (CARDS programme), and to the countries now 
falling under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(TACIS and MEDA programmes). This procedure foresees that the 
partner country identifies an area which is part of its development 
strategy, and where it would need specific technical assistance 
from the EU. The European Commission finances the technical 
expert who will be chosen by the partner country from among 
national experts proposed and seconded by the competent 
authorities of the EU Member States. The twinning procedure has 
already been used quite often in the area of crime prevention and 
criminal justice, and the European Commission envisages the 
extension of this mechanism to all geographical areas, as well as 
its further adaptation to the field of security and justice, where the 
relevant expertise is very often only available at the level of the 
administrations of the EU Member States. A more specific tool, 
which is already available in this area, is the so-called counter-
terrorism experts' network, which was set up in 2005 by the Council 
together with the European Commission. This network foresees 
that the EU Member States put at the disposal their experts in all 
areas covered by the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 for 
technical assistance missions in partner countries. 
In conclusion, the EU has adopted concrete steps with a view to 
pushing the Paris Declaration agenda forward and to achieving 
greater aid effectiveness in all areas including crime prevention and 
criminal justice. It remains to be seen in the coming years whether 
the ambitious goals set by the EU and the whole international 
community will be reached. While the Paris Declaration has set a 
series of targets for 2010 to be measured through indicators of 
progress for each of its commitments, the European Commission 
with other main donors has started to look at the complex issue of 
identifying suitable indicators for so-called "non-traditional" aid 
sectors such as security and justice, where so far it has often been 
difficult to measure the concrete impact of external aid in the area 
of security and justice in partner countries. 
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Previous presentations have articulated some of the main 
challenges encountered in receiving and providing effective 
technical assistance in the field of criminal justice and crime 
prevention. Getting access to effective assistance can be a 
particularly difficult endeavour for small developing states. As 
recipient countries, many small states encounter some distinct 
difficulties in obtaining the kind of technical assistance and support 
they need to build their own institutional capacity and proceed with 
the reforms they need to put into effect. 
As was mentioned, there is a growing consensus around best 
practices for promoting criminal justice and security reforms and 
capacity building through technical assistance. We have heard that 
there is a growing consensus around some of the principles that 
should inform the design and delivery of technical assistance. 
Among them, five important ones come to mind immediately: (1) 
making sure that the assistance offered is adapted to the context 
and the circumstances of the countries in which it takes place; (2) 
ensuring that the proposed activities and reforms are locally owned 
and directed; (3) ensuring that the assistance addresses genuine 
local priorities; (4) remaining mindful of local capacity, including the 
capacity to absorb and benefit from the technical assistance; and, 
(5) staying away from ad hoc, piecemeal initiatives and adopting, 
wherever possible, a sector-wide approach to change and capacity 
building.  
I would like to review with you here the whole question of 
“context” and its relevance to capacity building initiatives and 
technical assistance in the field of crime prevention and criminal 
justice. After that, I will try to draw your attention to a number of 
contextual elements that should be kept in mind in offering 
assistance to small developing states.  
Enhancing the effectiveness of the technical assistance being 
provided to requesting States means finding ways to adapt our 
approaches and methods to differing country situations, whether it 
is in fragile states, in post-conflict situations, or small states. It also 
means ensuring that the principles of harmonization, alignment,
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and result-based management are adapted to weak capacity of 
many institutions and the specific challenges that they face. Recent 
attempts to develop technical assistance assessment tools to better 
understand the needs and priorities of requesting states1 have also 
recognized the importance of assessing the context in which the 
technical assistance is being requested or will be provided. But, 
what are we looking for specifically in that “context”? 
 
 
Assessing the Context of Technical Assistance Activities 
 
It is relatively easy to identify a need for technical assistance or a 
new opportunity for programming and cooperation in the area of 
justice sector reforms. As experience has demonstrated, the 
success of technical assistance and capacity building initiatives in 
the justice sector cannot be taken for granted, no matter how 
critical the need for a particular reform.  
Typically, many of the “needs assessments” conducted as part 
of program planning in the sector tend to focus on identifying gaps 
and weaknesses in the processes and systems, shortages in 
qualified human resources, and deficiencies in the legislative 
framework. The weakest studies will simply compare the situation 
in a developing country to that in more developed country. In short, 
they focus on the “needs” of the system, without an understanding 
of the reasons why these needs exist and why the deficiencies may 
not be easily correctable.  
Very often, the pre-conditions of success do not exist or their 
absence has not been sufficiently taken into account in the design 
of technical assistance and capacity development initiatives. 
Justice reforms involve complex, and essentially political, 
processes. The political, ideological, financial, normative and 
institutional contexts in which justice and security reforms are 
undertaken must be taken into account in determining possible 
forms of assistance. The impact of most types of assistance is 
usually constrained by these broader elements of the context and 
other factors relating to the development and implementation of 
proposed reforms. 
A number of conceptual frameworks already exist to analyze the 
relevance of contextual variables in designing technical assistance 
and capacity development programmes. Each framework attributes 
varying degrees of importance to various contextual factors. The 
UNODC has adopted guidelines for the preparation of country 
                                                     
1 For example, the UNODC Criminal Justice Reform Unit (Rule of Law Section)   
project to develop a “criminal justice assessment toolkit” which recognizes the 
need to assess various elements of the context in which the technical assistance 
is being requested.  
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profiles.2 The Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations3 has prepared an institutional assessment framework to 
assist governments on how best to strengthen democratic 
governance of the security sector.4 The framework, produced for 
the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, identifies five key entry 
points for a strategy to enhance the democratic governance of the 
security sector: (1) the rule of law and its application to the security 
sector; (2) the capacity for policy development, planning and 
implementation; (3) the professionalism of the sector; (4) internal 
and external oversight, and, (5) the capacity to manage security 
sector expenditures. 
The relative utility of such frameworks resides in their ability to 
synthesize a large amount of information relevant to justice and 
crime prevention programming and to set out this information in a 
form that is accessible and clear. The caveat is that these tools 
should not lead to literal interpretations and hasty conclusions. 
They are likely to be much more useful as tools to support the 
analysis of other sources of information that are available on a 
country in which reforms are being contemplated. Furthermore, 
these instruments can only provide what is essentially a “snap-
shot” picture taken at a given point in time and it should be 
remembered that most elements of this general context are in a 
state of constant flux.  
 
 
Country Readiness Profiles 
 
Drawing on the work completed for the UNDP by Nicole Ball5 and 
other sources, the following brief presentation sets out a general 
framework within which the main elements of the context within 
which cooperation initiatives are developed can be identified and 
the opportunities for successful programming can be considered.  
Nine of the most relevant elements of the general context in 
which justice sector reform and capacity building programmes are 
being developed are listed below. These elements are then 
assembled into a grid that provides a “country readiness profile” 
                                                     
2 For example: UNODC Research and Analysis Section (2004). Format and 
Guidelines for the Preparation of UNODC Country Profiles, Vienna, December 
2004. 
3 Clingendael is a non-profit foundation established under Dutch law based in The 
Hague. It is partly funded by the the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Defence, but it is an autonomous organisation. 
4 See: Ball, N., Bouta, T, and L. van de Goor (2003). Enhancing Democratic 
Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework, A 
report prepared by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
5 Ball, N. (2002). Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual 
Framework for UNDP. New York: UNDP, October 9, 2002. 
http://www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/UNDP_SSR_Concept_Paper_Oct_9_2002. 
DOC  
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with respect to the potential orientations of justice sector assistance 
and capacity building initiatives and the likelihood of their success.6  
1. Political context: generally, (a) in terms of political stability7 and 
(b) in terms of the political rights and civil liberties of citizens8; 
and specifically, (c) in terms of the capacity of civil authorities to 
exercise oversight and control over the various elements of the 
security sector9; and, (d) in terms of the political commitment 
that exists to genuinely reform the justice sector. 
2. Geopolitical: (a) at a general level, whether the country is under 
some significant external threats such as transnational crime, 
terrorism, or aggression or threats from other countries10; (b) at 
a more specific level, whether the country is involved and/or 
capable of participating in regional initiatives; and, (c) whether 
there exist effective regional cooperation mechanisms in the 
justice and security sectors in which the country participates. 
3. Psychological: (a) at a general level, the level of insecurity and 
public fear of crime and violence; (b) the credibility and the 
legitimacy that the justice sector and its institutions have in the 
eyes of the public; and, (c) the level of public support for justice 
sector reforms11.  
                                                     
6 This grid is adapted from Dandurand, Y., Griffiths, C.T., and V. Chin (2004). 
Towards a Programming Framework for Development Assistance in the Justice 
and Security Sector. Gatineau: Americas Branch, CIDA. 
7 One can use an indicator developed by the World Bank as part of its 
governance research program. It includes the absence of politically related 
violence, intimidation, and terrorism. 
8 For convenience, the worldwide survey conducted annually by the US-based 
organization Freedom House to monitor the progress and decline of political 
rights and civil liberties is used here. The comprehensive annual assessment 
assigns countries political rights and civil liberties ratings and categorized them 
as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. The survey rates each country on a seven-point 
scale for both political rights and civil liberties (1 representing the most free and 7 
the least Partly Free” (countries whose ratings average 3.0-5.0); and “Not Free” 
(countries whose ratings average 5.5-7.0). The ratings are not only assessments 
of the conduct of governments, but are intended to reflect the reality of daily life. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/table2004.pdf  
9 The scale is one from a point where the security sector is virtually in control of 
political life (1), to a point where there is a very limited capacity of the civil 
authorities to exercise control over most elements of the JSS (2), a point where 
democratic accountability of JSS bodies to civil authorities is inadequate or 
deteriorating (3), a point where the capacity of the civil authorities to exercise 
oversight and control over the security bodies is weak (4); and, to a point where 
civil authorities can generally exercise oversight and effective control over all the 
JSS bodies. 
10 See for example: Berry, L., Curtis, G. E., Hudson, R. A., and N. A. Kollars 
(2002). A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist 
Groups. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, May 
2002. 
11 Keeping in mind, of course, that the reforms supported by the public may be 
very punitive and not always in keeping with international human rights and other 
justice standards.  
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4. Economic: (a) the overall economic context; (b) the current 
financial capacity of the country to invest in justice sector 
reforms; (c) the availability of external financial support for the 
justice sector. 
5. Normative: (a) the extent to which the legal basis for democratic 
accountability of security bodies to civil authorities is developed; 
(b) the extent to which the country actively subscribes to internal 
human rights and other relevant standards relevant to the 
justice sector; and, (c) the strength and quality of the rule of law. 
12 
6. Government effectiveness: (a) generally, in terms of the 
quality of policy formulation, bureaucracy and public services13; 
(b) specifically, in terms of the effectiveness of government as it 
relates to the justice sector; and, (c) whether or not there exist 
clear, workable and well-accepted overall plans and strategies 
for justice sector reforms. 
7. Corruption: (a) in general, the effective commitment of and 
progress made by government in controlling corruption; and, 
specifically14, (b) the control of corruption in the justice sector 
and, in particular, in law enforcement. 
8. Institutional context: (a) in general, the level of development of 
fundamental institutions, their human and institutional capacity, 
and their ability to respond positively to proposed reforms; 
specifically, (b) the country’s legislative capacity, including not 
only the capacity to draft proposed laws, but also to successfully 
develop them through consultative processes and secure their 
democratic adoption; (c) capacity of the financial management 
systems to support justice sector reforms and financially plan for 
their success; (d) the law enforcement capacity; (e) the judicial 
capacity; (f) the correctional system capacity; and, (g) the 
strength and relative capacity of oversight agencies (where they 
exist). 
9. Civil society involvement: (a) the extent to which civil society 
is developed and active; (b) the extent to which civil society is 
able to be actively involved in the planning and implementation 
of justice reforms (from being actively prevented from doing so, 
to being barely tolerated or just beginning, to being encouraged, 
                                                     
12 The World Bank Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot uses the 
“strength and quality of the rule of law” indicator, which it defines as including 
independence of the judiciary, predictability of justice, protection of human rights 
(including political and legal rights). See: Kaufman, D., Kraay, A. and M. 
Mastruzzi (2003). Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002. 
Washington: World Bank. 
13 See: World Bank Indicators – Governance Research Indicators (Kaufman, D., 
Kraay, A. and M. Mastruzzi (2003), op. cit.)  
14 There are various measures of corruption. The World Bank Index, as it relates 
to the Control of Corruption, has developed an indicator relating to the frequency 
of irregular payments to judges and public officials. See: Kaufman, D., Kraay, A. 
and M. Mastruzzi (2003), op.cit.  
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but not well facilitated, to being strong, and to being the norm), 
(c) the involvement of civil society in monitoring the operation of 
the justice sector; and, (d) the government’s and the justice 
sector’s willingness to involve civil society. 
 
JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM READINESS COUNTRY PROFILE 
The General Context of Technical Assistance Activities 
DIMENSION - - - -/+ + ++ 
Political stability 
Political rights  
Control of civil authorities over justice sector 
Political 
Commitment to reform of justice sector 
External threats / vulnerability 
Capacity for regional cooperation Geopolitical 
Participation in regional mechanisms 
Insecurity and fear of crime and violence 
Public trust in and credibility of the system Psychological 
Public support for justice sector reforms 
The overall economic context 
Capacity to invest in justice sector reforms Economic 
Availability of external assistance 
Legal basis of justice sector’s democratic 
accountability 
Commitment to compliance with int. standards 
Normative  
Strength and quality of the rule of law 
In general 
In security sector 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Planning in sector 
Control of corruption 
Corruption Control of corruption in the justice sector 
Level of development of fundamental institutions 
Financial management and oversight capacity 
Legal framework 
Law enforcement capacity 
Judicial capacity 
Correctional capacity 
Institutional 
Context 
Strength and capacity of oversight agencies  
General strength of civil society 
Civil society involvement in justice sector planning 
Civil society monitoring of the justice sector 
activities 
Civil Society 
Involvement 
Justice sector’s willingness to involve civil society 
 
 
The General Context of Small States 
 
What is a small state? Fourteen so-called “small states” are on the 
United Nations list of least developed countries (LDC). There is of 
course no single definition of a “small country”, because size is a 
relative concept. However, it is clear that, generally speaking, the 
size of a country’s population tends to be highly correlated with the 
size of its territory and its GDP. “Small state” is a term that is 
applied to a diverse group of sovereign countries, some quite 
wealthy, some very poor, many with a population of less than 1.5 
million. Using that standard, 45 countries have been categorized as 
small countries by the Joint Task Force of the World Bank and the 
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Commonwealth on Small States15. Three out four are islands and 
in some cases widely dispersed multi-island states. Some of them 
are quite far from major markets. The Task Force report concluded 
that many of the developing small states do share a number of 
characteristics that pose special development challenges. In 
particular, they are particularly vulnerable to external events and 
market fluctuations, and they suffer from a limited capacity in both 
the public and private sectors. 
The vulnerability of small states, including their economic 
vulnerability, is something that must be well understood as part of 
the context in which crime prevention and criminal justice initiatives 
take place in these countries. Many small states are particularly 
vulnerable to external events and market fluctuations. Overcoming 
vulnerabilities arising from factors such as globalization, 
environmental degradation and global warming, and international 
crime is not only a constant challenge for these countries, but also 
one which they can rarely face on their own. They are particularly 
dependent on outside assistance.  
Globalization and, more specifically, the emergence and 
expansion of transnational organized crime and the spectre of 
international terrorism, has presented many small states with new 
security challenges. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, for example, 
there are serious questions as to whether the justice and security 
sectors in these island nations have the capacity to respond to 
such threats. This, in turn, raises broader questions about the 
nature and extent of the international and regional assistance, 
coordination, and cooperation that may be available to confront 
these threats.16  
Small countries which are unable to develop their own system 
capacities, particularly those that are infrequently required for 
cooperation, cannot afford to be omitted from the newly-formed 
regimes of international cooperation. They cannot let themselves 
become the region’s weakest security point and a target for 
organized crime elements. On the other hand, bringing in the 
required reforms and developing the capacity required to join these 
emerging cooperation regimes is sometimes overwhelming for 
smaller countries. A number of strategies are currently being 
developed to assist these countries in implementing the necessary 
reforms in an integrated manner. These strategies usually require 
that a sectoral approach be taken in the implementation of these 
new international obligations. 
                                                     
15 World Bank (2000). Report of the Commonwealth Secretariat / World Bank 
Joint Task Force on Small States. Washington: World Bank, April 2000. 
16 See: Griffiths, C.T., Dandurand, Y., and V. Chin (2005). “Development 
Assistance and Police Reform: Programming Opportunities and Lessons 
Learned”, The Canadian Review of Policing Research , Issue Two, pp. 101-112. 
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The rationale behind many international cooperation initiatives is 
premised on the realization that crime is increasingly de-
territorialized and that criminal organizations can operate 
internationally from any location. Organized crime experts have 
identified what they call the “weakest link” factor, which predicts 
that increasingly mobile criminal organizations are more likely to 
operate in countries with a weak law enforcement and criminal 
justice capacity. Furthermore, some of these threats represent a 
different kind of challenge for a small island state for which well-
funded, dangerously armed and well connected criminal 
organizations constitute formidable opponents. Caribbean countries 
are not only vulnerable to these threats because of their small size 
and/or their relatively weak public security sector, but also because 
of their proximity to one of the largest markets for illegal services 
and commodities in the world.  
For many small states, the burden of participation in the 
increasingly internationalized regime of crime control and crime 
prevention falls upon a small number of individuals and weaker, 
less developed institutions. Heavy demands are placed upon them 
in terms of their participation in various international initiatives to 
combat crime, to increase international cooperation, to harmonize 
criminal law and criminal justice processes. The emergence and 
expansion of transnational crime and the spectre of international 
terrorism can take on a particular significance for them. They are 
frequently at risk of becoming one of the “weakest links” in the 
global regime to prevent transnational organized crime, money 
laundering, corruption, and terrorism. 
Among the specific difficulties that are typically encountered by 
small states and have implications for technical assistance and 
capacity building programming in the justice sector, one should 
keep a close eye on the following typical characteristics of small 
states and the difficulties they entail: 
• their limited financial and institutional capacity;  
• the limited capacity of their justice sector institutions; 
• the problems they face with respect to the exodus of human 
capital (disaffected youth issues, “brain drain” issues); 
• their limited ability to create and maintain their own institutional 
capacity (sustainability challenges); 
• their frequent inability to participate directly in the negotiation of 
international policies and treaties; 
• their inability to participate fully in various global regimes (e.g. 
the international anti-money laundering/counter-terrorism 
financing regime); and, 
• the limited economic, political or diplomatic leverage at their 
disposal for obtaining the collaboration of powerful neighbours 
and other States.  
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It is clear that small states, because of many of these difficulties, 
have been particularly affected by declining trends in development 
assistance. The sheer volume of reforms they are expected to 
undertake in the name of greater international cooperation 
frequently overwhelms small states. Yet, accessing effective 
assistance remains particularly challenging for small developing 
states. They are usually not in the “driver’s seat” when it comes to 
defining priorities for technical assistance and having a say in 
determining what they need the most.  
 
 
Identifying Local Priorities 
 
Establishing priorities is always a challenge. Evidently, the limited 
capacity of small states to undertake reform initiatives makes that 
prioritization even more important. Unfortunately, many have 
systematically identified their priorities through various studies and 
consultations only to see them ignored or contradicted by donors. 
All too often, the available assistance continues to be poorly 
planned, fragmented and offered in the same unbending format 
regardless of a country’s own planning process or capacity to 
absorb the assistance. 
Many small states have been encouraged by donors to work 
together to identify regional priorities for technical assistance and 
capacity building in the justice sector. For example, countries of the 
Caribbean have received assistance and devoted a fair amount of 
resources to identifying current weaknesses and deficiencies in 
their justice and security sectors. Some of them have acquired a 
capacity, often with the assistance of outside consultants, for policy 
analysis and planning in these sectors. In fact, a frequently heard 
criticism is that countries have to move more decisively from the 
planning stage to the implementation stage of the proposed 
reforms. There is, in several countries of that region, a palpable 
public impatience with the slow pace at which reforms are being 
implemented, if not already a widespread disaffection with the 
reform process itself. There is, in many jurisdictions, a perception of 
“piétinement” and a general concern about an overall lack of 
progress.  
Priorities for action are frequently identified and reiterated, but 
the human and financial resources to address these priorities are 
often absent. Blame for the lack of progress is sometimes attributed 
to local inertia, incompetence, corruption, or even to political 
tribalism. However, there is the widespread perception that there 
are also issues with the kind of external assistance that is made 
available to countries of the region and how it is delivered. There 
are frequent complaints that external assistance is too often offered 
in a piecemeal manner and for reform projects that are insufficiently 
integrated with the activities of other components of the system.  
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There is often the perception that the donors’ own security 
concerns or policy priorities assume priority over the identified 
needs of the recipient country. Internal security concerns in 
recipient countries are not weighed as heavily as compared to 
international, hemispheric, or regional concerns, or even the 
security concerns of powerful neighbours. Further, the assistance is 
generally not offered in a timely manner and is very rarely 
committed for periods of time sufficient to ensure the success of the 
fundamental reforms that are required.  
 
 
The Promises of Regional Approaches 
 
Small states are often pressured into adopting a regional approach 
to justice sector capacity development. From the point of view of 
donors, that can represent a potential economy of scale in 
delivering the required assistance. There is no denying that 
regional cooperation may sometime provide a potential avenue by 
which countries might reduce the high per capita costs of providing 
essential services or proceeding with reform initiatives. Moreover, 
the sharing of information and country experience can highlight 
options for successful strategies to reduce capacity constraints. 
However, such regional approaches tend to fit the donor’s agenda 
more closely than the national agenda for reform: every country 
involved, for example, has to be ready for the same reforms at the 
same time.  
One example of regional cooperation among small states is 
found in the work of the CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime 
and Security (2002)17 which proposed the establishment of a 
regional authority for Crime Prevention and Counter Drug 
Strategies (a Caribbean Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
Commission). It also called for the creation of national crime control 
commissions, where they do not already exist, which could develop 
national crime and security strategies and cooperate with similar 
bodies in other countries. The question of developing a regional 
capacity for rapid response to drug-related and serious crimes 
within CARICOM member countries was also given a high priority 
by the Task Force. The idea of creating a regional high security 
prison, initially proposed for an OECS (Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States18) country, was also suggested as a CARICOM 
initiative. The Task Force offered a number of recommendations 
with respect to law reform, illegal drugs, illegal firearms, terrorism 
prevention, and criminal deportees. At the centre of the Task 
                                                     
17 Caribbean Community (2002). CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and 
Security Report. (Chairman: Lancelot Selman). September 2002. 
18 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of 
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher (Kitts) & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines 
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Force’s proposed priorities was the need to strengthen the capacity 
of the law enforcement agencies to control crime. Nearly three 
years later, it may be informative to look at how little donor support 
these initiatives have effectively received and how they were 
implemented regionally. 
Another example of regional justice sector initiatives involving 
small states can be found in the work of the OECS. As small island 
states with small populations, OECS countries share many justice 
and human security concerns and challenges. Local officials are 
aware of the countries’ potential vulnerability to a number of major 
security threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, organized 
crime, and natural disasters. Drug trafficking continues to be a 
major security issue19 and efforts to combat it are likely to continue 
to absorb much of the resources and capacity of these countries’ 
security sector. Governments, NGOs, the business sector, and 
citizens are, understandably, very concerned with their countries’ 
inability to respond to these challenges on their own. Regional and 
sub-regional responses to these challenges are seen as key to 
successfully addressing these issues. The latter are also linked to 
plans for greater economic association among these small states. 
With the freer movement of people, goods and capital that is being 
envisaged, new security challenges are being identified. 
The economic association envisaged by OECS Member States 
is very similar to the European Union. To this end, Eastern 
Caribbean countries have undertaken a review of the Treaty of 
Basseterre (1981), which provided the legal basis of the OECS, 
and a report of a special Committee is currently being reviewed. 
The objective is for the more free movement of people, goods, and 
capital. Many of the treaty countries are also members of 
CARICOM and, as such, also have obligations to move forward 
with the plans for greater economic integration at that level. While 
these are parallel exercises, the OECS appears to be moving faster 
on some of these issues than is CARICOM. Countries of the region 
have become more aware that their future development may be at 
stake and that they must take the reform and development of these 
sectors very seriously. This can provide some real opportunities for 
meaningful interventions by outside actors, although it can present 
risks as well. 
The success of reforms and capacity-building initiatives in the 
justice sectors depends, in large measure, on whether they reflect 
a local consensus, a commitment to action, and some level of 
effective national mobilization. Local ownership of proposed 
reforms is emphasized in all development assistance activities, but, 
in particular, in the justice and security sectors which 
understandably remain two of the last bastions of uncompromised 
                                                     
19 U.S. Department of State (2004). International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report – 2003, pp. 19-45. 
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national sovereignty. Similar to other governance issues, these are 
areas that call for considerable dialogue and consultation between 
local agents of change and external actors.  
The OECD/DAC policy statement recommends that a regional 
perspective to security and justice reform be adopted, even when 
assistance is provided in support of a national reform program.20 
The OECD suggests that the common security needs faced by a 
region be identified. There are many reasons why the OECD and 
others recommend regional approaches, including the fact that: (1) 
as security challenges often involve cross border (transnational) 
issues, they are part of a “regional security complex”; (2) it can be 
helpful and more effective to have collective responses to security 
issues; (3) unaddressed security issues can lead to conflict within 
the region and weak points that can be exploited by criminal 
elements and others; and, (4) the need for capacity development is 
often better addressed by initiatives at the regional and sub-
regional levels, particularly when regional programming can 
produce economies of scale and a greater harmonization between 
security systems that will invariably be called upon to cooperate in 
defending the region against outside security threats.  
There are also some potential disadvantages to regional 
approaches to assistance for security system reform (SSR). 
Greene cautioned that a regional approach may: (1) encourage 
inappropriate regional generalisations; (2) be based on inadequate 
analysis of specific national challenges, strengths, needs and 
opportunities; (3) encounter some national resistance based on 
regional politics; and, (4) introduce a bias in the identification of 
priorities for action and entail significant opportunity costs for 
specific national programs.21 Greene also concluded “there may be 
real advantages to developing regional approaches and 
perspectives to SSR strategies and assistance, so long as this 
does not detract unduly from the need for specific national analysis 
and programming, and that opportunities are also pursued to 
develop thematic or sectoral strategies and programs”.22  
It should be evident that regional approaches, if they are to be 
more than a collection of disparate projects at the national level, 
require careful planning and meticulous design, as well as a strong 
executing agency. The pre-conditions to success, including the 
required political commitment to the objectives of the reform, are 
often hard to maintain over time and across the region. 
Nevertheless, regional approaches to promote international 
                                                     
20 OECD (2004). Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good 
Practice. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
21 Greene, O. (2003). “Security Sector Reform, Conflict Prevention and Regional 
Perspectives”, Journal of Security Sector Management. Vol. 1 (1), p.8 
22 Idem, pp. 1-15. 
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cooperation are often the only effective approaches in dealing with 
external, transnational security issues/threats.  
In the Caribbean, as was mentioned previously, a number of 
common themes have already emerged at the regional level that 
could facilitate the identification of some regional reform goals and 
initiatives. For example, the CARICOM Regional Task Force on 
Crime and Security is already proposing initiatives against activities 
that pose a direct security threat to the region and is proposing 
multilateral initiatives in areas in which countries of the region have 
already committed to collaborate.  
In some cases, a regional or sub-regional project may offer a 
particularly promising and cost-effective way of promoting 
coordinated approaches to fight transnational security threats and 
preventing crime displacement from one country to another. For 
example, a Special Meeting of the OECS Authority on the Economy 
(October 2002) recommended that serious consideration be given 
to regionalizing some of the critical functions of government in 
order to make them cost effective. A regional police and a regional 
prison service are likely candidates and, as mentioned previously, 
consultants were hired by the organization’s secretariat to develop 
some regionalization of services scenarios. 
 
 
Coordination of Donor Activities 
 
Good coordination among donors is particularly important for small 
states. The multiplicity of donors and their overlapping or conflicting 
priorities and administrative requirements place a heavy and 
unnecessary burden on limited administrative capacity in small 
developing states. It is important, from the point of view of small 
states, to find ways to reduce transactions costs by actively 
promoting better donor coordination and exploring flexible 
programming options. Country-led framework for reform and 
capacity building are particularly important in that context.  
Donors and providers of assistance should adapt their 
instruments to suit small states’ institutional capacity and scale. 
Assistance is often fragmented and offered in the same format 
regardless of a country’s institution and capacity to absorb the 
assistance. Donors ought to find ways of offering technical 
assistance in a more integrated manner. Building institutional 
capacity needs to be undertaken in close consultation with recipient 
agencies and tailored carefully to their particular needs and 
circumstances. Experience in the Pacific suggests the need for a 
long-term commitment and close coordination of activities by 
donors are needed to strengthen generally weak institutions and 
human resource capacity. 
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Evaluation and Result-Based Methods 
 
Result-based methodologies and the requirements for evaluations 
may place additional burdens on small states. In that regard, best 
practices have not been identified yet which would be suited to the 
situations of small states. In fact, very few technical assistance 
tools have been designed with the needs and circumstances of 
small states in mind. Donors and technical assistance providers 
should adapt their instruments to suit small states’ limited 
institutional capacity and small scale. 
 
 
Facilitating Factors 
 
I cannot conclude this presentation without highlighting the fact that 
some aspects of being a small developing state may indeed 
facilitate technical assistance and capacity building initiatives. For 
one thing, given the small size of the institutions involved, it is often 
easier to adopt a sector-wide approach to justice reform in small 
states.  
Integrated approaches to reform are made possible by the 
relatively small scale of the systems involved. Integrated assistance 
initiatives dealing with several issues at the same time are more 
likely to succeed in that environment than in others. By the same 
token, it may be easier to experiment in some cases with 
completely new methods and approaches. Finally, once the political 
will exists, simple planning tools can be developed and used for 
national capacity development and monitoring, and entry points for 
complex capacity development exercises are likely to be easier to 
identify in small states with fewer actors and smaller organizations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I am sure that the coming discussion will bring out a number of 
other examples and perhaps also identify issues that I have not had 
a chance to touch upon in this presentation. I hope that these few 
comments will at least have been useful in starting the discussion. 
As I have mentioned earlier, one of the frustrations of leaders in the 
justice sectors from small states is that they rarely have an 
opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the discussion about 
justice reform priorities and the shaping of international assistance 
programmes. The special challenges they face in trying to build the 
capacity of their justice institution deserve more careful attention.  
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Introduction 
 
The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, known as UNAFEI, has been 
carrying out the Technical Assistance Project for the Revitalization of 
the Volunteer Probation Aides System in the Philippines since 2003. 
The project’s purpose is the mobilization of volunteers for the 
community-based treatment of offenders in order to develop a 
sustainable Volunteer Probation Aides System through their 
empowered associations. 
 
 
What is the Volunteer Probation Aides System? 
  
The Volunteer Probation Aides System is a way of fostering 
community involvement in the treatment of offenders, which is 
advocated by the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial 
Measures (The Tokyo Rules). 
Why do we involve the community in the treatment of offenders? 
We do this because the community is the place where offenders will 
eventually return. If the community rejects these offenders, they will 
have nowhere to go. Therefore, we believe the cooperation of the 
community is essential for the reintegration of offenders into society. 
Volunteer Probation Aides, who are called VPAs, participate in the 
supervision of parolees and probationers in cooperation with 
professional probation officers. 
 
 
Key Players 
 
The key players in this project from Japan are as follows; UNAFEI, 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japanese 
volunteer probation officers (VPO). JICA is the incorporated 
administrative agency which provides official development assistance 
of the Japanese Government. Japanese VPOs are private citizens 
who assist professional probation officers, aid offenders of all ages to 
rehabilitate themselves at all levels in the community and enhance 
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crime prevention in the community. They play a very similar role to 
the VPAs in the Philippines. 
The key players from the Philippines are as follows; the Parole 
and Probation Administration of the Department of Justice (PPA), 
and of course, the Philippine volunteer probation aides. The PPA is 
the government office which is in charge of parole and probation 
supervision in the Philippines. VPAs are the target group of the 
project, and it should be noted that they receive no payment or 
compensation for their time, as they are volunteers. 
 
 
Brief History of VPAs in The Philippines 
 
The system of VPAs started in 1978 in the Philippines, modelled on 
the Japanese VPO system. During the 1980s, the number of VPAs 
exceeded 2,000. However, the VPA system gradually declined, and 
the number of VPAs decreased significantly, being 167 by 2002. 
Therefore, the Philippines Government, especially the PPA, wished 
to revitalize the VPAs activities and requested UNAFEI and JICA to 
support its revitalization. In 2003, the project for the Revitalization 
of the VPA system started in response to their request. 
 
Indicators and Tentative Desirable Outputs 
 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the technical assistance 
project we believe it is important to set the indicators beforehand. 
The indicators should be as clear and measurable as possible, 
though it might sometimes be difficult to set them in a project 
relating to crime prevention and criminal justice. 
In this technical assistance project, the indicators and tentative 
desirable outputs are as follows (the numbers shown on the right 
are the tentative desirable outputs): 
Number of VPAs 
• 167 ?(2,000 as of Dec. 2005) ? 5,000 
• Number of VPAs Associations 
• 0 ?(10 as of Dec. 2005) ? 90 
• Number of Field Training Laboratories 
• 0 ? (2 as of Dec. 2005) ? 9 
• Number of Clients (probationers and parolees) 
• 0 ? (5,000 as of Dec. 2005) ? 10,000 
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Contents of the Technical Assistance 
 
Contents of the Technical Assistance 
 
In this project, the Japanese side introduced the Japanese 
volunteer model, which has been in practice for more than 50 
years, as one of the “Best Practices” of the community-based 
treatment of offenders. 
Important features of the Japanese volunteer model include: 
• Supervision and assistance of the probationers and parolees 
assigned to the VPO  
• Organization of volunteers (e.g. establishment of volunteer 
associations) 
• Recruitment of volunteers by volunteers 
• Mechanism for motivating volunteers (e.g. award system) 
 
In addition, in the Japanese volunteer model, each VPO 
association also organizes a training programme for their 
volunteers. 
 
Benefit of VPAs Associations 
 
Here, I would like to briefly explain the benefit of organizing VPAs 
Associations. We believe the benefit of organizing VPAs 
Associations is sustainability. Volunteers face situations that may 
be difficult for them to cope with. Therefore, it is necessary for each 
VPA to have an opportunity to be supported and advised by their 
seniors and colleagues. The volunteers associations can provide 
such mutual support to volunteers and thus help prevent early 
dropout of the volunteers. 
Such associations can also help the sustainability of the 
Volunteer Probation Aides System by recruiting new volunteers, 
providing training and helping to raise funds from their local 
government and relevant agencies. 
 
 
Sense of Ownership 
 
Fostering a Sense of Ownership in the Recipient Countries 
 
We would like to emphasize that the strength of the sense of 
ownership by the Philippines shines through in this project, 
compared to other technical assistance projects.  
Needless to say, ownership by the recipient country is 
indispensable for the success of this type of technical assistance 
project. Therefore, we tried to respect and foster the Philippines 
side’s efforts to develop their own Volunteer Probation Aides 
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model. A sense of ownership in this project was fostered by the 
following factors: 
• The project was started based on the needs of the Philippines 
and in response to their request.  
• The project directly responded to their needs and interests. 
• The Philippines was actively involved in the planning of the 
project from the outset. 
• The project purpose and goals were clearly shared by both the 
donors and the recipients. 
 
Consequently, the strong commitment of the Philippines has 
been an important factor in the success of the project and for its 
self-sustainability.  
 
Commitment of the Philippines 
 
As an example of their strong commitment, the Philippines decided 
to adopt its own VPA model, based on the Japanese VPO model. 
They also conducted Pilot Projects, which successfully recruited 
109 Volunteer Probation Aides within one year. They also 
established training institutions called “Field Training Laboratories 
(FTL)”. 
In addition, the President of the Philippines issued an executive 
order on “Revitalizing the Volunteer Probation Aides (VPA) 
Program of the Parole and Probation Administration”, which 
expresses the country’s determination and commitment to the 
project. 
 
 
Challenges Ahead 
 
We are proud that the project has been so successful. However, as 
the number of VPAs increases, we will inevitably have to face some 
challenges regarding the relationship between VPAs and the 
probation officers. 
Establishing a cooperative relationship between them will be a 
key issue in the future. Some probation officers may be cautious 
about their jobs being taken over by the volunteers. However, the 
volunteers are motivated by their desire to contribute to the 
community. And the probation officers are the ones who guide the 
work of VPAs. Therefore, there should be no real conflict of interest 
between the two. 
Moreover, in the future, further cooperation and collaboration 
with the local government and the community will be sought to 
further enhance the system. 
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Bilateral and Multilateral Police Assistance in Serbia:  
Can Sustainability and Local Ownership be Ensured? 1 
 
 
Tor Tanke Holm  
Head of Section Analysis and Prevention  
Norwegian Police Directorate  
Oslo, Norway 
 
 
This paper outlines Norwegian experience with the development of 
technical assistance in the area of policing in Serbia, and the 
changes in approach over the period of four years. The 
presentation focuses on two missions in 2002-3 and 2005-6, using 
bilateral and multilateral approaches.  
 
JUNO I 
 
The first mission JUNO I in 2002 took place in the Backa Palanka 
Police District (BPPD), in Vojvodina Serbia, and involved some 200 
police officers working at the border with Croatia. The project 
objectives were: 
• To improve the relations between the public and the BPPD 
• To prevent and fight crime more effectively  
• To improve the competence of the BPPD in modern, democratic 
police standards and methods 
• To improve the infrastructure of the BPPD 
• To improve the working conditions for the employees in BPPD 
• Serve as a pilot in the overall police reform process in Serbia 
 
The project used a very broad approach, and initial work was 
focused on improving relations between the public and the police 
with integrity building. This included a series of study visits to 
Norway as well as training in the BPPD, and an introduction to 
problem-oriented policing. 
Integrity building, objectives and activities: 
• To improve the relations between the public and BPPD 
A four days study visit to Norway in May 
  - Senior management level – Strategic level 
 A five days training course in BP in June 
  - Middle management level – Tactical level 
 Three 2-days training courses in BP in June 
 - Operational level 
                                                     
1 Due to other commitments the author was unfortunately unable to provide a 
written text, and this paper uses the power-point presentation given at the 
workshop (Editors). 
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The introduction of the methodology of problem oriented policing 
presented the systematic use of different sources of information, in 
order to be able to infer patterns of crime. 
JUNO I also included a capacity building component, for both 
skills and infrastructure, with the following objectives and activities: 
• Improvement of management skills 
 Study visit to Norway in May  
 Training course in BP in September 
• Improvements to fight financial crime 
 Training course in BP in September/October 
 Study visit to Norway in October 
• Improvements to fight narcotics crime 
 Training course in BP in November  
 Study visit to Norway in November 
• Improvements of crime forensics  
 Study visit to Norway in December 
• Infrastructure improvement 
 Patrol cars, radio and telecommunication equipment, IT 
 equipment, crime forensic equipment, traffic safety 
 equipment and office equipment 
 
 
JUNO III 
 
This mission took place in 2005-6 at the request of the Serbian 
government, and was designed to cover the whole region of 
Vojvodina, some seven districts. It included both integrity and 
capacity building activities, mainly targeting senior staff and key 
personnel:  
• 3–days course for chiefs of police in strategic leadership, 
problem-oriented policing and strategic analysis 
• 3–days course for station commanders and senior officers in 
problem-oriented police work and project work. Local projects at 
the police stations were planned and prepared during this 
course 
• 14–days course for instructors (train-the-trainers) in problem-
oriented policing, strategic analysis and practical POP work 
• Three 5–days courses for analysts in strategic crime analysis 
• Visit of Norwegian experts to all seven Secretariats in Vojvodina 
in order to evaluate the quality of the POP-projects which had 
been carried out as part of the training 
• Close-up seminar in Belgrade (March 2006) with presentations 
of more than 30 projects. 
 
The mission again emphasized problem oriented policing and 
the importance of the use of strategic analysis in the prevention of 
crime (see diagrams below).  
 63
Crim e pattern  
“Hot spot”  
Identified  prob lem  
 
 
Agencies involved   
C rim inality  p reventive  
m easures 
 
 
S ituational crim e 
prevention  m easures 
 
 
Com m unity crim e 
prevention  m easures 
 
 
T im e for action   
Eva luation  m ethods 
p rocess and  outcom e 
 
 
 
Standard outline for the POP-projects
 
Norwegian Police Directorate
COMMUNITY POLICING
The local 
community
NGO`s and 
problem owners
Problemoriented 
policing
Solving process
 
 
Indicators for Sustainability and Ownership  
 
The activities of JUNO III were closely coordinated with the national 
police reform process taking place in Serbia. What is clear, 
therefore, is that there has been increasing involvement by the 
Serbian Police Service between 2001 and 2006 in the technical 
assistance activities undertaken by the Norwegian Police 
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Directorate. This illustrates the increasing importance given to a 
country-led approach. As the following factors summarize, this 
technical assistance project has striven to ensure mutual trust and 
respect, and achieve sustainability, with lasting capacity building 
and ownership and responsibility on the part of the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Serbian Police Service.  
• Closely connected to the national police reform process 
• Initial needs assessment and a thorough planning process 
• OSCE assessment report, 2001 
• Identification of critical success factors 
• Clearly defined objectives, roles and responsibilities 
• Logical development of the projects according to results and 
donor resources  
• Close cooperation with the Ministry of Interior from day one 
• Regular coordination with the OSCE and other donors 
• Involvement of the different levels of the Serbian police 
organisation 
• Focus on operational activities of day-to-day policing 
• From brief training courses to long-lasting projects and 
operations 
• Increasing responsibility of the Serbian Police Service in the 
projects from 2002-2006 
• Mutual trust and respect. 
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Asistencia Técnica y Cooperación en América Latina en 
Materia de Sobrepoblación y Hacinamiento Penitenciario 
 
 
Ronald Woodbridge  
Senior Adviser 
ILANUD 
 
 
This paper offers an example of the technical assistance activities 
conducted by the United Nations Latin American Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD) in 
the areas of crime prevention, criminal justice and human rights. 
The Institute, as a catalyst for technical assistance projects, 
focuses on some of the challenges encountered by countries of the 
region and on developing solutions and strategies that are adapted 
to their circumstances. The paper discusses the Institute’s general 
approach to technical assistance activities by focusing on its recent 
experience in the area of prison reforms, in particular strategies to 
address the problem of prison overcrowding. The problem in 
countries of the region is the result of general growth in the 
population as well as an increased reliance on incarceration both 
as a punishment and as a preventive measure. Technical 
assistance activities in that respect have focused on the reduction 
of the use of incarceration as a preventive measure, capacity 
building, legal and procedural reforms, prison construction, and the 
elaboration of alternatives to prisons. Recent technical assistance 
activities in several countries are described in more detail. 
En la brevedad de los diez minutos de que dispongo 
ejemplificaré de manera muy esquemática la experiencia adquirida 
por ILANUD en los niveles regional, sub-regional y nacional en la 
canalización de la asistencia técnica en su ámbito de acción: 
prevención del delito, justicia penal y desarrollo en un marco de 
irrestricto respeto por los derechos humanos. Para ello trabajamos 
dentro del marco de los temas prioritarios fijados periódicamente 
por la Comisión de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Prevención del 
Delito y la Justicia Penal y específicamente en respuesta a los 
requerimientos que los países de la región formulan al Instituto.  
La experiencia adquirida por ILANUD a lo largo de su existencia 
y de su papel de catalizador de la cooperación internacional en 
áreas tan sensitivas no han seguido un proceso lineal y, en ese 
sentido, ha habido avances y retrocesos que han conducido a 
revisar su aproximación a los países y a la identificación de 
soluciones a los problemas que enfrenta el sector justicia.  
Una de las primeras lecciones aprendidas ha sido la necesidad 
de enfrentar el problema específico detectado dentro de un 
contexto integral del sistema de justicia penal y éste a la vez dentro 
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del contexto político, social y económico en que éste se 
desenvuelve. Muchas veces un modelo de intervención para dar 
solución a un problema que incide en el buen desempeño de la 
impartición de justicia se origina en el sistema de la defensa 
pública, de la fiscalía o de la propia policía. Muchas veces el 
fortalecimiento de un solo actor del sistema ocasiona problemas en 
el normal desempeño de los otros actores involucrados en le 
proceso. Ello comporta partir de un diagnóstico transversal del 
sistema que permita detectar el origen de los nodos que están 
afectando la totalidad del sistema. Este análisis inicial pasa por 
valorar las capacidades instaladas, la sensibilidad y el compromiso 
para el cambio y la factibilidad de llevar a cabo los procesos de 
reformas que se requieren y partir de propuestas inclusivas 
construidas con una amplia participación de los actores 
responsables y que se den los supuestos para llevarlas a cabo, 
todas ellas nutridas por la información que nos suministran el 
Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), La 
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPALC) el 
Banco Interamericano para el Desarrollo (BID) y el Banco Mundial 
(BM) y que dan mayor sustento ante las distintas agencia de 
cooperación y de financiamiento multilateral presentes en la región.  
A partir de las lecciones aprendidas con el transcurso de los 
años ILANUD ha venido mejorando la metodología que utiliza para 
llevar adelante su tarea y la cual comprende investigación básica 
para la acción, procesos comprensivos de consulta, sensibilización 
y capacitación, asistencia técnica y divulgación, como acciones 
que se complementan entre sí de manera simultánea y 
permanente y que se lleven a cabo longitudinalmente para producir 
una incidencia importante en el corto, mediano y largo plazo a 
través de programas permanentes.  
Los países comprendidos en el mandato del Instituto de 
medianos y bajos ingresos1 (en este caso de América Latina y del 
Caribe) requieren de asistencia técnica y de capacitación en su 
propio país para el desarrollo de las capacidades de sus 
instituciones pero también requieren de actividades regionales que 
les provean reinformación comparada sobre la criminalidad y el 
funcionamiento de sus sistemas de justicia penal.  
En ese sentido, el Instituto promueve actividades regionales con 
los operadores de los diversos subsistemas de la justicia penal y 
de las instituciones que intervienen en su prevención (jueces, 
defensores, fiscales, policías, penitenciariítas, defensores de los 
habitantes y organismos coadyuvantes) quienes, previamente a su 
participación, envían información básica sobre el marco legal y el 
funcionamiento de los sistemas de justicia penal administrando los  
                                                     
1 Utilizamos la denominación de países de altos, medianos y bajos ingresos que 
viene siendo utilizada en los últimos años por el Banco Mundial 
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instrumentos facilitados por ILANUD y que se han venido 
elaborando y perfeccionando a los largo de los años, los cuales 
son analizados, procesados y comparados para su utilización 
como material de trabajo en las distintas actividades.  
Tan importante como la información básica es el espacio para 
compartirla y discutirla lo que permite detectar de manera 
comprensiva e inclusiva los principales problemas que afectan 
cada parte del sistema y las formas de resolverlos en sus 
respectivos países y favorece una cooperación horizontal. En estas 
actividades participan también homólogos de países de altos 
ingresos que transmiten sus experiencias que han resultado útiles 
para una mejor definición y adecuación de las posibles respuestas 
a los problemas similares en sus respectivos países y sus 
realidades.  
El problema de la sobrepoblación y hacinamiento de las 
prisiones posiblemente sea el más grave problema que confrontan 
los sistemas de justicia penal en América Latina. Hay dos grandes 
factores que confluyen a elevar las poblaciones penitenciarias 
generando este creciente fenómeno 
1. El solo crecimiento demográfico de nuestros países, que 
son países de elevada tasa de crecimiento, aunque éste 
solamente significa entre el 25 y el 30 % del aumento 
(midiendo el aumento habido entre 1995 y el 2005); 
2. El aumento en el uso de la prisión tanto de la prisión 
preventiva como de la prisión como pena que ha provocado 
que desde 1992 hasta el 2005 las tasas de los países, como 
característica general, crecieron aproximadamente un 80%. 
 
Frente a esta situación los países han definido dos acciones 
indispensables y urgentes que deben llevar a cabo: 
La primera de ellas es la formulación de políticas y realización 
de acciones que resuelvan en el mediano y largo plazo la situación 
en sus raíces: construcción carcelaria, reformas a la legislación y 
utilización de sanciones no privativas de libertad para delitos que 
ameritan este tipo de sanción; 
La segunda de ellas es administrar la situación existente 
clasificando cuidadosamente a las reclusas y reclusos para reducir 
el número de conflictos y muertes en la prisión lo cual debe 
hacerse según la capacidad de convivencia no violenta. Se ha 
evidenciado que un gran número de hechos de violencia y muerte 
son ocasionados por criterios erróneos de clasificación que reúne 
en un mismo ámbito a personas y grupos antagónicos.  
Algunos ejemplos de la cooperación internacional y asistencia 
técnica canalizada por ILANUD a los países de la región en esta 
esfera de acción ha sido el Programa sobre Sistemas 
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Penitenciarios desarrollado durante diez años con el concurso 
técnico de otros Institutos que conforman la Red de Institutos 
(PNI): primero del Centro Internacional para la Reforma Penal y la 
Política Criminal de Canadá (ICCLR), del Instituto de las Naciones 
Unidas para Asia y el Lejano Oriente para la Prevención del Delito 
y el Tratamiento del Delincuente (UNAFEI), del Instituto Raoul 
Wallenberg de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Humanitario de 
Suecia (RWI), así como del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones 
Unidas para los Derechos Humanos (OACDH) y con el apoyo 
sostenido y continuado aliento de las agencias de cooperación de 
Canadá, Japón, Suecia y del Programa de naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo (PNUD), lo que ha permitido al Instituto brindar un 
acompañamiento técnico en el mediano y largo plazo a los países 
de la región e incidir de manera significativa en el mejoramiento de 
los distintos aspectos del sistema. Dicho de otra manera, el 
Instituto ha logrado articular las necesidades de los países de la 
región, los avances y las experiencias de otros Institutos 
especializados de la Red de países desarrollados con los recursos 
financieros de la cooperación de sus respectivos países en 
programas de corto, mediano y largo plazo. Este programa se ha 
visto fortalecido también mediante becas, giras de estudio y 
observación, así como cursos especializados en Japón y Suecia.  
Acciones concretas en el terreno han contribuido a la reducción 
de la población penitenciaria en países como El Ecuador, donde se 
logró mediante un programa de defensores públicos liberar a más 
de mil reclusos cuya situación procesal permitía su 
encarcelamiento. Con resultados similares se llevó a cabo un 
programa en Honduras que permitió estructurar los servicios de la 
defensa pública con la asistencia técnica y financiera de la Unión 
Europea.  
De manera similar, en el caso de Costa Rica, también con el 
valioso apoyo de la Unión Europea y del Fondo de Naciones 
Unidas para la Infancia (UNICEF), se contribuyó a una notable 
reducción del número de menores de edad privados de libertad 
cooperando en programas de capacitación de los operadores del 
sistema de justicia penal juvenil (jueces, fiscales y defensores) a la 
entrada en vigor de la nueva ley de justicia penal juvenil y todas las 
alternativas previstas. En este campo, ILANUD ha venido 
brindando capacitación y asistencia técnica a los países de la 
región participando activamente en la formulación, adecuación y 
aprobación de nuevas legislaciones penales juveniles de 
conformidad con la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los 
Derechos del Niño en estrecho trabajo con las comisiones 
legislativas y representantes de la sociedad civil.  
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Con el apoyo técnico y financiero del Instituto Nacional de 
Justicia, del Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos de 
América, se logró digitalizar y poner en línea en su portal las 
publicaciones especializadas del Instituto y su colección de 
publicaciones periódicas más importantes en materia criminológica 
favoreciendo así la divulgación de los resultados de las 
investigaciones y estudios de base desarrollados dentro de sus 
programas.  
Más recientemente, también con el concurso de UNAFEI y con 
el generoso apoyo financiero de la cooperación del Gobierno de 
Japón, dada la transformación de un sistema inquisitivo hacia un 
sistema acusatorio que garantice una mayor protección de los 
derechos fundamentales en los últimos años en los países de 
América Latina, el Instituto ha continuado apoyando a los sistemas 
de justicia penal (fiscalías, tribunales y defensorías) en el 
desarrollo de sus capacidades y en el mejoramiento de los 
conocimientos de sus operadores para la adecuada 
implementación de las reformas.  
Un primer resultado de este programa ha sido la identificación 
de los principales problemas que afectan actualmente a los países 
de región para la adecuada implementación de las reformas: i) 
aplicación excesiva de la prisión preventiva: ii) impunidad como 
consecuencia de la debilidad en los procesos de investigación de 
hechos de alto contenido violento y de actos ligados a sectores 
poderosos que causan grave impacto en la sociedad; iii) eficacia y 
utilización insuficiente de mecanismos simplificadores del proceso 
que faciliten respuestas oportunas y menos violentas a delitos de 
menor impacto social que favorezcan a los protagonistas del 
conflicto; iv) eficiencia y métodos de trabajo y recursos materiales y 
humanos inadecuados o insuficientes para la gestión de altos y 
crecientes volúmenes de casos y v) una cultura autoritaria que ha 
impedido un empoderamiento de los principios que sustentan el 
modelo de estado de Derecho como límite del poder arbitrario por 
parte de los operadores jurídicos y de los sectores sociales con 
incidencia en la opinión pública.  
Estos ejemplos demuestran como el Instituto a pesar de su 
dimensión y de la vasta zona geográfica en que le corresponde 
operar ha contribuido como brazo ejecutor de ONUDD y miembro 
de la red de Institutos potenciar y maximizar la cooperación 
internacional, inter-agencial y horizontal entre países de la misma 
región estableciendo una coordinación técnica más estrecha de 
sus programas con aquellos desarrollados por los institutos 
hermanos de otras latitudes. 
ILANUD, como instituto regional especializado de las Naciones 
Unidas para América Latina ha desempeñado un importante papel 
catalizador de la cooperación para lograr una mayor eficiencia en 
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la utilización de recursos provenientes de la cooperación 
internacional y que aún está presente en nuestra región. 
En nombre de nuestro Director, don Elías Carranza, quien se 
encuentra participando en la V Reunión de Ministros de Justicia de 
las Américas, que se celebra en este momento en la ciudad de 
Santo Domingo, República Dominicana, analizando estos mismos 
temas, y que por ello ha delegado su representación en el suscrito, 
en el mío y en el del Instituto agradecemos la invitación que se nos 
hizo para compartir estas experiencias con ustedes y reiterarles 
nuestra disposición de continuar sirviéndoles en todo lo que esté a 
nuestro alcance. 
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UNAFRI’s Technical Assistance to its Member States –  
an Example 
 
 
N. Masamba Sita, Director  
and 
Patrick Mwaita, Research Assistant  
UNAFRI 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI) was established in 1989 by a 
Statute of the Conference of Ministers of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).  
In its Resolution 609 (XXII) of April 1987, UNECA reaffirmed the 
importance of the Institute and the role it is called upon to play in 
assisting Member States in: (1) assessing crime trends in the 
region and their impact on national development; (2) the 
formulation of policies and programmes for the prevention of crime 
and the treatment of offenders; (3) the promotion of criminal justice 
reforms in the context of development; and, (4) encouraging 
technical co-operation among African countries in the field of crime 
prevention and criminal justice.  
The Institute is a member of the United Nations Programme 
Network of Institutes (PNI) for Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice. It serves countries of the region by providing, at their 
request, the needed practical assistance in the different areas 
mentioned above. Within the limits of its financial resources, the 
Institute organizes various consultative missions. These missions 
give UNAFRI an opportunity to provide or arrange for, based on 
consultations with national experts, the required technical 
assistance. In so doing, problems of concern are identified and 
locally available human, material or financial resources are 
identified and accessed, and a timeframe for the implementation of 
the agreed upon intervention is defined. The technical assistance is 
tailored to local needs and circumstances and it takes into 
consideration the particular socio-economic realities of the country 
and the region. 
Assistance can be provided in the following areas: juvenile 
justice, prison administration, community services, community 
policing, law enforcement, and penal reform. The focus is on the 
dissemination of good practices based on African traditions and 
international standards and norms.  
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Due to time limitations, this paper will focus on one example of 
practical technical assistance offered by UNAFRI to its Member 
States in the area of prison administration. It describes the nature, 
scope and focus of the project, as well as its perceived impact. 
Prisons have been identified as an appropriate entry point for 
meaningful social interventions as part of an overall strategy to 
strengthen crime prevention through the effective social 
rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders.  
In this instance, technical assistance with respect to prison 
administration was provided by UNAFRI to two countries, Uganda 
and Mozambique. We will only focus here on Uganda as the project 
has been implemented very successful in that country. 
 
 
The Project 
 
Participants to workshops, seminars, and conferences organized 
by UNAFRI and other organizations used to say that prisoners are 
individuals who are rejected by their family and their community of 
origin. The pilot project, From Prison Back Home, intended to verify 
that assumption and discuss it with the families and communities 
concerned. Effective measures can indeed be taken to facilitate the 
return of prisoners to their family and community.  
The project’s goal was to provide effective social rehabilitation 
and reintegration of prisoners in their respective community of 
origin through, inter alia, the use of mediation and reconciliation 
techniques by social workers. The social worker’s intervention was 
designed to improve the relationships between prisoners and the 
members of the community they came from or were going to. 
Inmates were prepared to return home and members of their 
communities were prepared to receive them. This involved 
facilitating a process of “internal reconciliation” as well as 
reconciliation with other members of the concerned local 
community. 
It is important to note that generally when a prisoner is asked 
why he/she is in prison, the common response is: “they are saying 
that I …” instead of “I …”. Assuming responsibility for their actions 
is an indication that a process of internal reconciliation has been 
achieved.1 
                                                     
1 Sita, N.M. Aliobe, A.D., Okoth, R.O., Kyazze, S.N., Kayemba, G.A., and J. C. 
Okiror (2005). From Prison Back Home: Social Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
as Phases of the Same Social Process (The case of Uganda). Kampala, Uganda: 
UNAFRI and Uganda Prisons Service (UPS), pp. 18-19. 
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The work of social workers consists mainly of preparing the 
prisoner to return home and preparing members of the community 
to receive them. In order to do so, the social worker must first help 
the prisoner achieve internal reconciliation. It is on that foundation 
that the external reconciliation (between the prisoner and members 
of his/her community) will be developed. Members of the 
concerned community include the victims and their relatives, the 
relatives of the inmates, neighbours, local authorities, etc. They 
have to be prepared at the same time to receive the prisoner back 
home upon his or her release. In this exercise, social workers are 
the go-betweens who must work to help improve the relationship 
among all those involved. 
 The project aimed, inter alia, at reducing recidivism (which was 
estimated in 1994 at 60% among people released from Uganda 
prisons) through: (1) training of social workers in order to develop 
their capacity to provide social work services in prisons; and, (2) 
promoting the effective involvement of local communities in the 
process.  
 
 
Training Workshops  
 
Social workers were exposed, inter alia, to the following fields of 
knowledge and skills: (1) social work in prisons; (2) modalities of 
social reaction; (3) styles of social control2; and, (4) care taking 
logics, mainly the “Needle Logic” and “Knife Logic” as extracted 
from a proverb.3 As needle mends fabrics, the “Needle Logic” 
mends the social fabric, while the knife cuts it. The needle logic 
guides the elders in the process of handling an issue. That is why, 
when it applies, they would say: “We bring the needle to mend the 
social fabric and not the knife to cut it”.4 
It is worth noting that there is a need for social workers to be 
exposed to techniques of conflict resolution. Generally, 
imprisonment does not eliminate the extant tension among the 
involved social actors. Some prisoners refuse to go back home 
because the problem that sent them to prison is not solved. As a 
go-between and a facilitator of effective reconciliation between the 
offender and the community, the social worker needs to be familiar 
with, among other things, basic techniques of conflict resolution 
such as negotiation and mediation. At the invitation of the 
Welfare/Rehabilitation Section of Uganda Prisons Service (UPS), 
                                                     
2 See Horwitz, A.V. (1990). The Logic of Social Control, Plenum Press. New York 
and London, pp. 19-95 
3 See Sita, N.M., (2005), op. cit, p.13 
4 Sita, M.N. (1989). Le “NTUMBU” ou le “KIBAKU”: Vers une théorie formelle du 
contrôle social; Thèse de doctorat, Département de Criminologie et de Droit 
Pénal, Ecole de Criminologie, Université Catholique de Louvain, pp. 119-131. 
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UNAFRI contributed to training sessions organized by UPS for the 
newly recruited social workers.  
 
 
Financial Support  
 
The UPS, as an arm of the Uganda Government, made funds for 
the project available. This shows that some projects can be fully 
supported by Member States. Local experts and other local 
resources were mobilized and put to task. UNAFRI’s own 
contribution consisted of providing expertise and human resources.  
 
 
Impact of the Project  
 
The project has been integrated into the regular operations of the 
Welfare and Rehabilitation Section. The Uganda Prisons Service 
(UPS) has come to recognize the importance of social work in 
prisons and has been rebuilding that function within the system and 
recruiting new social workers. As shown in Table 1, below, the 
strength of the UPS social work capacity has been increasing 
steadily.  
Table 1: Strength of Uganda Prisons Social Workers Since 1990 (Source: 
Prisons Headquarters) 
POSITIONS YEAR TOTAL 
ACWR PWRO SWRO WRO AWRO SWRA WRA 
1990 33 N/E N/E 01 06 04 01 21 
1994 13 N/E 01 01 03 01 01 06 
1996 19 N/E 01 01 10 01 01 05 
2006 20 01 01 05 09 N/E 04 - 
Abbreviations in Full 
ACWR:  Assistant Commissioner Welfare/Rehabilitation 
PWRO: Principal Welfare/Rehabilitation Officer 
SWRO: Senior Welfare/Rehabilitation Officer 
WRO: Welfare/Rehabilitation Officer 
AWRO: Assistant Welfare/Rehabilitation Officer 
SWRA: Senior Welfare/Rehabilitation Assistant 
WRA: Welfare/Rehabilitation Assistant 
N/E:  Non-Existent 
 
Table 1 reveals, inter alia, that: (1) from 1990 to 1996 the 
Section did not have Assistant Commissioners 
Welfare/Rehabilitation (ACWR); (2) the position of Principal 
Welfare/Rehabilitation Officer (PWRO) was not filled; and, (3) the 
number of Senior Welfare/Rehabilitation Officers (SWRO) 
increased from 1 to 5 in 2006. It shows a major decrease in the 
number of social workers between 1990 and 1994, and an increase 
between 1994 and 2006 (see graph below).  
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Table 2: Established Base Positions (Source: Prisons 
Headquarters) 
S/NO POST SCALE NO. 
OF 
POSTS 
1 Assistant Commissioner 
Welfare/Rehabilitation 
U1 01 
2 Principal Welfare/Rehabilitation 
Officer 
U2 01 
3 Senior Welfare/Rehabilitation 
Officer 
U3 05 
4 Welfare/Rehabilitation Officer U5b-4 15 
5 Senior Welfare/Rehabilitation 
Officer Grade I 
U5b-a 08 
6 Senior Welfare/Rehabilitation 
Officer Grade II 
U5c 06 
7 Assistant Welfare/Rehabilitation 
Officer 
U6 12 
8 Welfare/Rehabilitation Assistant 
Grade I 
U6 10 
9 Welfare/Rehabilitation Assistant 
Grade II 
U7 10 
10 Chaplains U5c 04 
11 Teachers Grade V U6 08 
12 Teachers Grade III U7 14 
TOTAL 94 
 
The total number of positions has increased to 94. This confirms 
the observed trend revealed in the graph above: the Uganda 
Prisons Service has recognized the importance of social work in 
prisons. We consider that social workers are equipped to effectively 
implement some important aspects of the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners, particularly those relating to: 
contacts with the outside world; religion; notification of death, 
illness, and transfer; treatment; education and recreation; and, 
social relations and after-care.  
TREND
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Summary  
 
UNAFRI offers its technical assistance in different areas of Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice to all its Member States, in 
accordance with their needs. Member States are urged to utilize 
the programmes available at their Institute, to address crime as a 
major impediment to sustainable socio-economic development in 
the region. Support from other members of the PNI and from other 
organisations can help UNAFRI offer technical assistance that is 
tailored to the needs and circumstances of requesting African 
governments. 
We consider that the project has had a very positive impact in 
Uganda as it was fully integrated of the regular operations of the 
Welfare/Rehabilitation Section of the Uganda Prisons Service 
(UPS). Other elements might have contributed to the improvements 
observed in the operations of the UPS, but improving the system’s 
capacity to offer social work services was a vital component in that 
process. This is a fact that is being recognized by the authorities in 
the Uganda Prisons. Based on its relevance, social work has now 
assumed a higher profile in the management of prisons in Uganda.  
Other African countries have expressed an interest in the 
project. Prisons officers from Mozambique, for example, came 
twice to Uganda to observe the implementation of the project and 
its impact. In line with its mandate, UNAFRI remains available to 
offer the practical assistance needed by its Member States in the 
areas referred to in the introductory paragraphs of this 
presentation.  
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Human Rights and Technical Assistance Projects  
in Afghanistan and Iraq 
 
 
International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC) 
International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences 
(ISISC) and the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) of 
DePaul University College of Law are at the forefront of 
contemporary human rights research, training, publication and 
advocacy. ISISC and IHRLI work independently and together on a 
variety of human rights, rule of law, justice and capacity-building 
projects throughout the world with a special focus on Latin America 
and Arab and Muslim countries. Both ISISC and IHRLI were 
founded by Professor Cherif Bassiouni, the president of the two 
organizations.  
This paper reviews a number of initiatives designed and 
implemented by ISISC and IHRLI to contribute to national 
reconstruction, scholarship, training, and technical assistance in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Currently, ISISC and IHRLI are working in 
Iraq to reform legal education, document and analyze violations 
committed during Saddam Hussein’s regime, provide innovative 
human rights education, support the process of writing a new 
constitution, and aid the country in devising a comprehensive policy 
of post-conflict justice. In Afghanistan, ISISC and IHRLI have been 
responsible hitherto for training more than 1,300 members of the 
new judiciary and law enforcement, engaging in related capacity-
building projects and developing a series of new rule of law 
initiatives in the criminal justice and in the drug sector. In addition, 
in 2004 the UN Secretary General appointed Professor Bassiouni 
as United Nations Independent Expert on Human Rights in 
Afghanistan.  
 
 
Afghanistan 
 
For more than two decades, Afghanistan has experienced 
continuous armed conflict. During this time, over one million 
civilians were killed and over four million were forced to flee the 
country as refugees. As a result of years of violence and 
authoritarian rule, government institutions, particularly legal 
institutions, suffer from limited legitimacy and an array of severe 
structural deficiencies. Following the fall of the Taliban, significant 
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coordinated international assistance has been directed to the 
country to assist in a broad process of national reconstruction. 
Afghanistan is an ethnically diverse nation, characterized by 
significant regional differences and a population unaccustomed to a 
strong centralized state and lacking a tradition of democratic 
governance. It is one of the poorest countries in the world and, in 
2002, it ranked 173 out of 178 countries on the United Nations 
Human Development Index. According to the National Human 
Development Report 2005, 70% of the population in 2002 lived with 
less than $2 US a day, one out of every two children under the age 
of five was underweight and overall life expectancy was below 45 
years, nearly 20 years less than in neighbouring countries. In 
addition, Afghans currently face many serious human rights 
violations including systematic abuses of the administration of 
justice, severe threats posed by the illegal drug industry, and 
egregious violations of women and children’s rights and the rights 
of disempowered members of society.  
Afghanistan now has a unique opportunity for national 
reconstruction. Despite the encouraging implementation of 
democratic elections that led to the establishment of a new 
Parliament in 2006, the provision of new laws and some signs of 
economic reconstruction, the political transition still demands a 
variety of social, economic, and political programmes. Its long-term 
success also requires the development and implementation of a 
comprehensive domestic policy to strengthen justice and protect 
fundamental rights. ISISC and IHRLI are involved in several 
initiatives to contribute to this broad social and political process. 
ISISC and IHRLI have been involved in several technical 
assistance and human rights programmes in Afghanistan that use 
the train-the-trainer methodology. These programmes include: the 
Interim Training for the Afghan Judiciary; the Training Course on 
the Afghan Interim Criminal Procedure Code; the Provincial Justice 
Initiative; and the Advanced Training for judges, prosecutors and 
police officers of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Judicial Task Force. 
In addition, in 2003, ISISC and IHRLI staff has assisted Professor 
Bassiouni in his capacity as the United Nations Independent Expert 
on Human Rights in Afghanistan. 
Since 2003, ISISC has been training more than 1,300 operators 
of the Afghan Justice System and more initiatives are scheduled for 
the future. 
 
 
The Interim Training Programme for the Afghan Judiciary 
 
ISISC and the International Development Law Organization (IDLO) 
were selected by the Italian government, which assumed 
responsibility for judicial sector reform at key donors meetings in 
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Bonn in 2001 and London in 2006. They were selected to provide 
integrated training for judges, prosecutors and officials working in 
the new Ministry of Justice. In response, ISISC and IDLO 
developed the Interim Training Programme for the Afghan Judiciary 
which ran from July 2003 through December 2004. IDLO provided 
training on civil and commercial legal training and ISISC covered 
issues of criminal justice and human rights.  
The Interim Training Programme was developed in collaboration 
with the Judicial Reform Commission (JRC), the Afghan Ministry of 
Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Office of the Attorney General. 
The Programme also benefited from the assistance of IHRLI staff 
and the United Nations Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA).  
The Interim Training Programme provided training and capacity 
building to over 450 participants, more than 50 of whom were 
women. The participants were selected by the JRC and the Afghan 
Supreme Court and represent a diverse array of jurisdictions, 
regions, ethnicities, and educational backgrounds. The programme 
provided 300 hours of instruction in Kabul over 16 months. The 
train-the-trainer methodology was used to prepare a series of 
individuals who were later employed for new capacity building 
initiatives addressed to other Afghan legal professionals.  
Programme trainers were distinguished Egyptian judges, 
prosecutors and academics with a strong background in Islamic law 
(Shari’a), international law, comparative criminal law, and human 
rights. These professionals were chosen because the Afghan legal 
system is based on Egyptian codes and, like many Muslim world 
systems, strongly rooted in Shari’a. Lectures were presented in 
Arabic and simultaneously translated into Dari. Trainings included 
lectures, discussions, moot courts, legal writing seminars, units on 
financial and organizational management, and exercises to improve 
communication with witnesses, practitioners, and administrative 
personnel.  
The Programme also included two Study Tours to Egypt and 
Italy for selected participants. 
 
 
International Study Tours 
 
Since 2003, ISISC organized a number of Study Tours to Italy, 
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to provide selected Afghan 
participants with additional training and with hands-on experience 
of the structure and organization of other judicial systems. 
The first study tour was conducted in November 2003, within the 
framework of the Interim Training Programme for the Afghan 
Judiciary, and involved 20 trainees, 5 of whom were women. 
Participants traveled to Egypt and Italy to receive training in 
criminal law and comparative legal systems. The trip included a 
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two-week course at the Egyptian National Judicial Studies Center, 
where participants learned about key elements of the Egyptian 
judiciary including legal procedure, appeals processes, systems for 
addressing corruption, and the general administration of criminal 
and civil actions. Participants also met with high-ranking members 
of the Egyptian Government and visited law schools, forensic 
laboratories, and courts. The study tour continued to Italy at ISISC, 
where participants received training in international law and the 
structure and function of the Italian legal system, including visits to 
government offices, prisons, law enforcement institutions, and 
courts. 
The second study tour for the Interim Training Programme for 
the Afghan Judiciary was conducted in July 2004 when a selected 
group of legal high ranking Afghan officials spent a week at ISISC 
attending an intensive seminar on strategies to address current 
human rights violations in Afghanistan. Participants were provided 
with draft versions of documents outlining key human rights 
challenges; they worked together to outline mechanisms through 
which the government could cooperate with the international 
community to create meaningful and country-specific policy 
responses.  
In August 2004, ISISC facilitated a study tour to the United Arab 
Emirates, which UNODC organized with the aim of introducing 
Afghan senior justice official to a different judicial system and to its 
educational background. 
Within the framework of the UNODC Justice Programme for 
Afghanistan, ISISC contributed to organize a study tour to Egypt for 
six selected high ranking officials of the Afghan Authorities. During 
the visit, the participants met with Egyptian Government 
counterparts and attended a seminar on Comparative Criminal 
Justice System, Functions of the Egyptian Judiciary, and Execution 
of Penalties in order to foster a discussion on the experience by 
both countries. 
As a result of the U/10 strategy to improve the fight against drug 
in Afghanistan, UNODC invited ISISC to organize a new visit to 
Cairo, Egypt in December 2005. During the one-week tour, the 
delegation representing the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Judicial 
Task Force, composed of the Chief Judge and two members of the 
Drug Prosecution Office, the Deputy Head and two investigators of 
the Investigation Department, covered the structure, functions and 
management of the Egyptian Counter-Narcotics legal system, the 
judicial system, the narcotics police department, in addition to 
meeting with the Egyptian counterparts.  
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Training Course on the Interim Criminal Procedure Code 
 
In order to improve judicial proceedings, the Afghan government 
approved a new Interim Criminal Procedure Code in April 2004. 
However, many judges and other legal professional remained 
unfamiliar with the new code. In response to this situation, ISISC 
worked in cooperation with the Italian Justice Office in Kabul, which 
was chaired by President Giuseppe Di Gennaro, to develop the 
Training Course on the Interim Criminal Procedure Code. 
The course assisted 120 Afghan judges, prosecutors, police 
officers, law professors and Ministry of Justice officials in 
understanding how to use the new law in daily practice. The goal of 
the training was to create a diverse, qualified group of Afghan legal 
professionals who could subsequently provide training to 
colleagues throughout the country. The course was conducted in 
May 2004 at Kabul University, and was based on a signed 
memorandum between ISISC and the university. The Training 
Course combined lectures, discussions, and a general evaluation 
of the new code with participatory and practical exercises including 
mock trials and case studies. Some of the lectures were delivered 
by participants of the Interim Training for the Afghan Judiciary.  
 
 
Provincial Justice Initiative 
 
The Provincial Justice Initiative was designed to address the 
concentration of State services in Kabul and the general lack of 
professional attention toward much of the country, especially 
isolated rural areas. This project prepared a core group of trainers 
who used ISISC methodology and material to run capacity building 
programmes for judges, prosecutors and others in the provinces. 
All of the trainers in the Provincial Justice Initiative participated to 
the Interim Training for the Afghan Judiciary and the Training 
Course on the Interim Criminal Procedure Code, and also received 
additional training.  
The Provincial Justice Initiative began in December 2004 with a 
three-month pilot project in the provinces of Paktia, Kunduz, and 
Balkh, and continued throughout 2005 and early 2006 in the five 
Provinces of Herat, Nangarhar, Badakshan, Wardak and Baghlan. 
A further advanced training for some of the advanced from some of 
the provinces was also conducted in Kabul. The training followed a 
methodology very similar to other capacity-building programmes: 
linking lectures, discussions and various practical exercises. 
To help implement this project, the Afghan Supreme Court has 
provided ISISC with an office at the court. This programme has 
been requiring a permanent coordination and support from the 
three major institutions of the Afghan Judiciary – the Supreme 
Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the Office of the Attorney 
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General – with whom it has been established a professional and 
conducive interaction.  
To date, more than 400 justice operators have been trained in 
the provinces and negotiations are underway to extend the same 
capacity-building initiative to the entire country. 
 
 
Advanced Training for Afghan Officers in the Drug Sector 
 
In December 2004, ISISC was invited to contribute to the fight 
against drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan, which is a 
major obstacle to the country development. The opium economy 
equals 38.2 percent of the country’s official GDP, and Afghanistan 
is now the world’s major producer of illegal narcotics, with 76 
percent of the supply (NHDR 2005). This situation impacts 
negatively on the human, social and economic development as it 
fuels corruption, growth of organized crime, violation of human 
rights, exploitation, and poverty. For this reason, a comprehensive 
country-specific intervention is highly needed. 
 
 
Technical Assistance to Counter Narcotics Judicial Task Force 
(CJTF) 
 
Through an intense cooperation with the United Nations Office on 
Drug and Crime (UNODC) and with the Embassy of the United 
Kingdom, which is the Leader Country in the fight against drugs 
according to the Bonn Agreement, a first capacity building 
intervention was designed to match the Afghan needs and ISISC 
expertise. 
From December 2004 and throughout 2005, ISISC has 
conducted three tailor-made training sessions addressing 23 
Judges, 56 Prosecutors and 63 officers from the Ministry of 
Counter Narcotics and the Ministry of Justice from Kabul as well as 
from the provinces. 
Each 6-week training course consisted of three hours of daily 
training covering four key areas: i) the principles of the new Afghan 
Constitution as related to criminal procedure and drug enforcement; 
ii) the interim criminal procedure code and related case 
management issues; iii) the new Afghan Drug Law; iv) international 
legal instruments to combat organized crime and drug trafficking. 
The advanced training combined lectures, discussions and 
practical exercises to an effort to increase participants’ 
understanding of how to combat drug trafficking while respecting 
due process and new elements of Afghan law. Training was 
provided by international experts with extensive experience in 
Shari’a and international criminal law as well as Afghans trained 
through other ISISC capacity building programmes. 
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Training for Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan 
 
The ongoing training project, which ISISC has been developing 
with the contribution of UK government, combines the models and 
methodology of other ISISC training projects in Afghanistan with 
the specific needs of the Operational Team of the Counter-
Narcotics Judicial Task Force (Intelligence, Investigation and 
Mobile Detection) in charge of prosecuting drug related criminal 
offences. This training has been focusing on enhancing their 
knowledge of the Afghan Criminal Procedure Code, new Counter 
Narcotics Law, and the constitutional principals aiming at keeping 
the conduct of their operational duties within the required legal 
frame. The scheduled number of trainees is around 200, which has 
been broken down into 9 groups of 20 participants to each be 
subjected to a one month training course. The thematic areas of 
the training will be: (a) principles of the new Afghan Constitution 
with particular emphasis on their links to the Afghan criminal 
procedure code and drug law; (b) interim criminal procedure code; 
(c) Afghan drug law; and (d) international legal instruments against 
organized crime and drug control 
 
 
United Nations Independent Expert for Human Rights in 
Afghanistan 
 
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni was appointed as United Nations 
Independent Expert for Human Rights in Afghanistan by the 
Secretary-General in 2004. In this capacity, he traveled with ISISC 
and IHRLI staff to Afghanistan in August 2004 and presented an 
interim report to the General Assembly’s Third Committee in 
October 2004. He returned to Afghanistan with ISISC and IHRLI 
staff in January 2005. The results of this research and 
consultations was presented to the Commission on Human Rights 
in Geneva in April 2005. 
During his first year as Independent Expert, Professor Bassiouni 
worked with IHRLI staff to review key reports and publications on 
the history of the conflict, the general political situation in the 
country and the overall human rights situation. In preparation for his 
site visits, he held extensive consultations in Geneva and the 
United States with representatives of the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, other UN agencies, and various 
experts on Afghanistan. While in the country, he met with President 
Hamid Karzai and senior governmental officials in the Afghan 
government, members and staff of the Afghan Independent Human 
Rights Commission, and representatives of foreign missions 
including the US and EU states. He also met with UNAMA staff, 
United Nations agencies, domestic and international NGOs, and 
individual experts. In addition, Professor Bassiouni and ISISC and 
IHRLI staff visited prisons in Kabul and the Logar province, met 
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with human rights, civil society and women’s organizations, and 
interviewed Afghan victims. 
As Independent Expert, Professor Bassiouni has drawn attention 
to an array of violations including: repressive actions by factional 
commanders, violations by state security forces, the unregulated 
activities of private security contractors, serious threats related to 
opium production and trafficking, violations of women’s rights, 
problems related to the customary law practices, inadequate 
attention to the disabled, issues faced by returning refugees and 
IDPs, and abuses committed by the United States-led Coalition 
forces. In response to these issues, Professor Bassiouni has called 
on the Afghan government to work with the international community 
to design and implement a comprehensive strategic plan regarding 
the rule of law, justice, and human rights.  
 
 
Support to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
 
Due to its strong commitment for the restoration of the Rule of Law 
in the Country, ISISC has been invited to cooperate with UNAMA to 
develop new initiatives in the Justice Sector. This partnership 
resulted in a course in the provinces of Kandahar, Badakshan and 
Hilmand on the Transitional Criminal Procedure Code with a 
particular focus on the constitutional principles in respect of human 
rights for 50 legal workers; moreover, a seminar on Human Rights 
in Afghanistan was jointly organized in order to foster a debate on 
possible interventions among international experts. 
 
 
Iraq 
 
Iraq is emerging from thirty-five years of brutal, authoritarian rule. 
From 1968 to 2003, Saddam Hussein and his Ba’th Party governed 
the country in an extraordinarily repressive manner, committing 
widespread and systematic violations of international human rights 
including: extrajudicial execution, torture, disappearances, rape and 
forced displacement.  
Saddam Hussein’s regime used intimidation, fear and terror as a 
central element of daily governance. The nation’s security services 
were large, well-financed, and integrated into every aspect of daily 
life. The government engaged in a massive and systematic 
destruction of several minority and ethnic groups, especially the 
country’s Kurdish population. Hussein’s regime also provoked wars 
of aggression with Iran (1980–1988), in which an estimated one 
million people died and Kuwait (1990), which led to thousands of 
deaths and provoked a coordinated international military response. 
These conflicts destroyed the Iraqi economy, created massive 
foreign debt, and devastated almost every aspect of the nation’s 
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infrastructure and human capital. The government brutally 
repressed various local uprisings, forcing millions to flee the 
country and waged a vicious campaign killing thousands and 
destroying countless villages.  
With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, the Iraqi 
people have an opportunity to reflect and respond to past atrocities, 
rebuild key rule of law institutions, and create a new system of 
government committed to the defence and protection of 
fundamental rights. ISISC and IHRLI are working in coordination 
with the new Iraqi government (especially the Ministry of Human 
Rights), Iraqi law schools, international donors and others to 
support training, capacity-building and other programmes to assist 
the country link human rights, rule of law, and post-conflict justice 
to the broad process of national reconstruction.  
ISISC and IHRLI are currently involved with a number of human 
rights and rule of law projects in Iraq, including initiatives to: i) 
assist Iraqi law schools with educational reform; ii) gather and 
analyze narratives of human rights violations committed during the 
prior regime; iii) provide human rights training to key government 
sectors; iv) support the drafting and implementation of the new 
constitution; v) conduct research, training, and advocacy on post-
conflict justice; vi) design and manage conferences on governance 
issues such as federalism and domestic security; vii) improve the 
defence and protection of women’s rights; and viii) provide training 
and capacity building for members of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 
These eight initiatives are jointly managed by ISISC and IHRLI staff 
working in offices in Siracusa, Chicago, and Sulaimaniya, Iraq. 
 
 
Raising the Bar – Legal Education Reform 
 
From 2003 through 2005, IHRLI and ISISC were involved in a legal 
education reform project in Iraq, involving close cooperation 
between the institutions and the Universities of Baghdad, Basra, 
and Sulaimaniya, while also providing nationwide support for 
faculty training and general educational reform. 
IHRLI and ISISC designed and managed a series of 
conferences in Iraq to encourage practical interaction between law 
faculty, government officials, members of the judiciary, and leaders 
within the legal community. These events addressed a variety of 
issues including ethics, property claims, the new Iraqi constitution, 
strengthening the national bar association, and post-conflict justice.  
IHRLI and ISISC organized conferences in the summer of 2004 
in Egypt and Italy for forty Iraqi law professors representing eleven 
universities. Iraqi faculty visited legal experts, government 
ministries, law schools, and representatives of the judiciary. They 
also participated in a two-week seminar at ISISC featuring 
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American, European, and Arab world scholars. In addition, a select 
group of professors travelled to the United States to visit law 
schools, courts, governmental offices, legal clinics, and 
professional organizations.  
IHRLI and ISISC worked with law faculty to modify existing 
curricula and develop new courses focusing on human rights, 
international criminal law, and commercial law. This process 
involved integrating practical elements of legal practice into the 
educational process through moot courts and clinics. In March 
2005, IHRLI assisted a team of Iraqi law students participate in an 
international law moot court competition in Washington, DC.  
IHRLI and ISISC also helped the Universities of Baghdad, 
Basra, and Sulaimaniya restore and upgrade their law libraries and 
legal research services. IHRLI and ISISC have provided substantial 
technical assistance in library planning and management, support 
for internet access, as well as extensive physical renovations. 
 
 
Iraq History Project 
 
This project collects and analyzes personal narratives of victims of 
human rights violations committed during the last three decades. 
The project uses testimonies of victims and others to document the 
severity and impact of the former regime’s systematic repression 
and help establish an objective record of past atrocities.  
This initiative will collect two to three thousand in-depth 
interviews from victims, victims’ family members, and others. The 
project also includes case study research and thematic interviews 
designed to document particular patterns of violence and 
repression. Material gathered in the field is transferred to a central 
location in Sulaimaniya where the information is entered into a 
specially designed qualitative database that protects information 
from tampering, destruction, or accidental loss.  
IHRLI and ISISC developed the methodology for this project 
which is based on work conducted by various truth commissions 
and similar research bodies. At full capacity, the project will involve 
an all Iraqi in-country staff composed of approximately forty-five 
interviewers, ten data-entry specialists, and about twenty others 
involved in analysis, writing, support, and management.  
The project will end its first year with the completion of a series 
of detailed reports to be published in Arabic, Kurdish, and English. 
The project is designed to continue for around three years and 
IHRLI and ISISC staff will assist the Iraqi team in seeking continued 
financial support for the project’s expansion and long-term 
development. 
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Educating for Democracy 
 
ISISC and IHRLI are involved in comprehensive human rights 
education in Iraq using a train-the-trainer model. In this initiative, 
IHRLI provides technical human rights training to government and 
civil society representatives working in areas of security, justice, 
and education.  
To aid in this process, IHRLI and ISISC are creating training 
units in Arabic and Kurdish that cover a number of key human 
rights issues including: international instruments, international and 
regional protective systems, civil society organizations, case 
studies, and the integration of human rights principles into domestic 
law. The material also links human rights concepts to existing Iraqi 
law, Shari’a, and the special challenges of the country’s social and 
political context.  
The goal of this train-the-trainer programme is to ensure that 
project participants are prepared to design and implement their own 
training sessions using materials developed for the project. 
Following agreements with each of the participating ministries, the 
trainers are responsible for managing human rights workshops at 
various levels within each of the participating ministries using the 
materials and methodologies developed by IHRLI and ISISC. 
IHRLI and ISISC are also planning a series of public activities 
related to thematic human rights education materials and 
developing strategies for both continued train-the-trainer 
programmes and the wide diffusion of human rights educational 
materials. 
 
 
Support for the Iraqi Constitutional Process 
 
ISISC and IHRLI have been working with the American Bar 
Association (ABA) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) on a 
series of programmes to support the process of creating, 
supporting and understanding the new Iraqi constitution. This 
initiative has established an advisory working group, provided 
various forms of legal assistance, and created a series of five 
books designed to assist the Iraqi people in addressing key issues 
linked to the drafting of the new constitution. 
The book series was designed to benefit newly elected officials, 
their advisors and assistants, representatives of civil society, and 
local leaders. The books were used extensively by key members of 
the constitutional drafting committee.  
 
The publications included:  
 1. Iraqi Constitutional Studies – Basic Principles for the New Iraqi 
Constitution – A collection of articles on key constitutional issues 
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by Iraqi legal professionals and academics who reflect the 
nation’s cultural and ethnic diversity. The book is based on work 
presented at an IHRLI-sponsored symposium on the Iraqi 
Constitution held at Baghdad University in October 2004, which 
was part of the Raising the Bar: Legal Education Reform project.  
 2. A Compilation of Iraqi Constitutions and Comparative Study of 
International Human Rights Standards – An overview of the 
evolution of Iraqi constitutional thought from 1925 to the present. 
It presents the texts of the nation’s basic laws and constitutions 
and provides a comparative analysis of these documents, 
including a review of all the Iraqi constitutions in relation to 
international human rights law standards. 
 3. A Compilation of Arab Constitutions and Comparative Study of 
International Human Rights Standards – A collection of all the 
Arab world constitutions. While many Arab governments do not 
provide adequate protections for fundamental rights, their 
constitutions are often excellent legal documents that provide 
many important guarantees for civil rights and public freedoms. 
This book includes a comparative study on due process 
protections and an analysis of Arab world constitutions in 
relation to international standards.  
 4. A Compilation of Legislation and Regulations of Select Arab 
Legal Systems – A compilation of selected Arab laws and 
regulations relating to legislative organization and procedure. 
During the second half of the 20th century, Arab states have 
sought to unify the general framework of their respective 
legislative processes, particularly through multilateral 
cooperation within the League of Arab States. This publication 
provides a useful guide of key examples from the region to aid 
the newly democratic Iraqi government.  
 5. Public Freedoms and Democracy – A collection of essays on the 
rights and freedoms necessary for a democratic system of 
government, including “Basic Principles of Democracy” by M. 
Cherif Bassiouni; “Human Rights and Public Freedoms in Arab 
Constitutions, Jurisprudence, Doctrine and the Islamic Shari’a” 
by Dr. Abd El-aziz Salman, Moataz Abo El-ezz, and Nefert 
Shihab, and a comparative study of Arab constitutional 
provisions and international standards. 
The goal of these publications is to assist Iraqi leaders, officials, 
representatives of civil society, and others in gaining access to 
valuable information to support the country’s democratic transition. 
IHRLI and ISISC have printed approximately 2,500 copies of each 
book. They have been widely distributed to key political actors, 
government ministries, United Nations staff, Iraqi law schools, 
judges, professionals, political parties, and others.  
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Support for Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq 
 
ISISC and IHRLI have long been involved with research, 
publication, and advocacy related to post-conflict and transitional 
justice.  
In June 2005, ISISC and IHRLI hosted an intensive training 
seminar on prosecutions, reparations, truth-telling, education, and 
memorialization that was supported by the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The conference lasted ten days and involved over 
forty Iraqis, including representatives of the Ministry of Human 
Rights, victims’ organizations, clerics, and representatives of civil 
society organizations. The conference presented key ideas 
regarding post-conflict justice as well as a comparative review of 
how other nations have faced past atrocities. The goal of the 
conference was to assist participants in developing plans and 
guidelines for post-conflict justice in Iraq.  
In addition, ISISC and IHRLI are collaborating to produce two 
publications related to transitional and post-conflict justice: 
1. Chicago Principles on Post Conflict Justice, an existing IHRLI 
publication to be translated into Arabic and Kurdish, which 
presents guiding ideas and strategies on how societies should 
address the social and political impact of gross violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law; and 
2. Critical Readings on Post-Conflict Justice, which presents a 
collection of carefully selected materials regarding key 
strategies of post-conflict justice. 
These projects have been developed in close consultation with 
key representatives of Iraqi government ministries and civil society.  
 
 
Seminars on Governance: Federalism and Domestic Security 
 
IHRLI and ISISC have worked together with the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to design and organize seminars on key questions 
of governance in Iraq with a special focus on federalism and 
domestic security. 
In November 2005, IHRLI and ISISC held a conference in Italy 
on practical elements of federalism in Iraq. The event brought 
together forty Iraqi political leaders who represented a diverse array 
of parties, ethnicities, and ideologies. The Iraqis included members 
of the constitutional drafting committee, legal advisors, 
representatives of the national legislature, academics, judges, 
government ministers and others. The goal of the seminar was to 
provide an overview of federalist/decentralized constitutional 
systems with the assistance of a number of international experts. 
The experts discussed federalism in general and provided a review 
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of specific examples drawn from Canada, Germany, Italy, the US, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries, with a special focus on 
how these systems address: power-sharing between national and 
regional bodies; legislation; taxation, management of natural 
resources; gender equality; and religious freedom. Participants 
established working groups to identify practical solutions to key 
federalism issues which will be presented in a final report.  
In February 2006, IHRLI and ISISC hosted an event on domestic 
security in Iraq. The seminar brought together high ranking security 
officials from around the country. The seminar considered a 
number of interrelated security issues including transnational 
organized crime, the relative value of international conventions, the 
Italian experience of fighting the mafia and organized crime, 
international law enforcement cooperation, drug trafficking, money 
laundering and reducing corruption.  
 
 
Gender Justice Initiative 
 
In November 2005, IHRLI and ISISC hosted a seminar in Amman, 
Jordan to promote gender justice in Iraq. The event was supported 
by the National Democratic Institute and included current and 
former ministers, parliamentarians, academics, and representatives 
of non-governmental organizations. Of the twenty-seven women 
leaders present, seventeen were from Iraq and ten were from other 
Arab states including: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestine, and Syria.  
The women’s rights experts who attended the conference issued 
a clear set of recommendations on constitutional amendments, 
legislation, and policy reforms. The group called on all policy-
makers in Iraq to take urgent steps towards reforming the Iraqi 
legal system to enhance and protect women's rights. The 
participants also formed a regional coalition called Women for 
Peace and Equality Network (WEPEN), developed a mission 
statement, and made plans for continued cooperation. 
In addition, the group has drafted a series of essays that will be 
published as a book entitled, Essays and Commentary on 
Women’s Rights in the Muslim World and as Related to the Iraqi 
National Context. The book will be published in January 2005 and 
widely distributed in Iraq and throughout the region. 
 
 
Technical Support for Iraqi Special Tribunal 
 
ISISC and IHRLI have been involved in a series of efforts to 
support the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), which is charged with 
managing criminal cases against Saddam Hussein and high level 
members of the Ba’athist regime.  
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In February 2005, ISISC and IHRLI hosted a week-long training 
seminar for approximately 70 member of the IST, including all the 
Tribunal’s judges, investigative judges, and prosecutors. The 
seminar focused on the use of forensic and scientific evidence for 
trials involving gross violations of international human rights, war 
crimes, and serious violations of international humanitarian law.  
The seminar allowed IST judges and staff to learn from world 
experts about issues such as the exhumation of mass graves, 
evidence collection and control, DNA identification, and satellite 
imagery. IHRLI and ISISC also presented an Arabic language 
analysis of internal problems with the IST Statute along with a 
variety of useful training materials. The seminar was designed to 
help revitalize the IST and integrate its activities within a broad-
based, comprehensive national strategy of post-conflict justice. 
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The EU Framework for Financial Mobilisation in the Area of 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice1  
 
 
Patrick Dölle, Administrator 
European Commission, EuropeAid 
 
 
Crime prevention and criminal justice have only recently become 
an area of competence for the European Union (EU). While the 
treaties establishing the European Communities, which were 
signed in the 50's, laid down the foundations for the creation of a 
common market, it was only the Treaty establishing the EU, signed 
in 1992 in Maastricht, which considered for the first time the field of 
"Justice and Home Affairs" (JHA) as a matter of common interest, 
and introduced provisions for areas and procedures for cooperation 
between the Member States of the EU.2 The 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam considerably extended EU competence in the field of 
JHA by pushing for the achievement of a "common area of 
freedom, security and justice" in the EU, where all legal, 
organisational and practical obstacles hampering efficient cross-
border cooperation in police and judicial matters, and the effective 
fight against trans-national crime, would gradually be removed. 
One important tool for this ambitious policy since the 90's has been 
the adoption of several EU programmes to finance activities 
promoting cooperation in JHA between the competent authorities of 
the EU Member States. 
Due to this new and steadily growing internal competence of the 
EU, JHA has also become a much more prominent issue in the 
field of EU external relations. While on the one hand provisions on 
cooperation in JHA are nowadays systematically included by the 
EU in all bilateral agreements negotiated with partner countries or  
                                                     
1 This paper deals with the financial framework for aid effectiveness in the EU, 
and should be read in conjunction with the paper on the EU approach to aid 
effectiveness by the same author. It should be noted that the paper reflects the 
views of the author and not necessarily the position of the European Commission.  
2 The first treaty was the Treaty establishing the European Community of Coal 
and Steel signed in 1952 in Paris, which expired in 2002. In 1957 were signed in 
Rome the Treaty establishing the European Community of Atomic Energy (also 
called "Euratom") and the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community. The latter, as it is by far the most important one, was renamed by the 
1992 EU Treaty of Maastricht in "Treaty establishing the European Community" 
(EC). The EU Treaty created besides the existing Treaties of the European 
Communities (henceforth also referred to as the "Community pillar" or the "first 
pillar" of the EU) two new areas of intergovernmental cooperation: the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (also referred to as the "second pillar" of the EU) and 
the area of "Justice and Home Affairs" (also referred to as the "third pillar" of the 
EU). 
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organisations, on the other hand the external aid provided by the 
EU increasingly focuses on technical assistance in this area. EU-
financed programmes and projects in the field of good governance, 
rule of law or security system reform provide support to partner 
countries notably to ratify and implement relevant international 
conventions, as well as for capacity-building measures to 
strengthen the partner countries' ability to prevent and fight crime 
and to cooperate at international level.  
As security has become in recent years one of the main 
concerns of its citizens, the EU has decided to step up its internal 
and external policy in the field of JHA further, including with regard 
to financial mobilisation. Since the current multi-annual financial 
framework for the EU budget is due to expire at the end of 2006, 
the European Parliament, the European Commission and the 
Council of the EU, which represents the 25 (and soon 27) Member 
States, entered into difficult negotiations on the next financial 
framework for the period 2007-2013, which eventually led to the 
adoption of an inter-institutional agreement in May 2006.3 The three 
institutions agreed that the EU concentrate its action over the next 
seven year-period on three main priorities, two of which being 
directly relevant for the area of crime prevention and criminal 
justice: namely the completion of the internal area of freedom, 
security and justice, and the establishment of the EU as a global 
player in assuming its regional responsibilities, promoting 
sustainable development and contributing to civilian and strategic 
security. In parallel to the discussions on the new financial 
framework, negotiations took place between the three main EU 
institutions on new financial instruments to address these EU 
priorities for the period 2007-2013 appropriately. While a 
completely new and ambitious legislative framework of financial 
instruments will be put in place for both the EU internal area of 
freedom, security and justice as well as EU external aid, the 
methods and procedures of EU financial mobilisation will instead 
remain essentially the same. 
 
 
EU Financial Mobilisation for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
 
The creation of an EU area of freedom, security and justice does 
not rely only on the development of common policies and 
cooperation mechanisms or on the harmonisation of national laws, 
but also on financial instruments aiming in particular to enhance the 
capacities of the competent EU Member States' authorities to 
cooperate with one another.  
                                                     
3 Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 139/1 of 14 June 2006. 
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So far the main programme relevant for the area of crime 
prevention and criminal justice is the so-called “AGIS” framework 
programme on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,4 
managed by the European Commission with a reference amount of 
65 M€ for the period 2003-2007. Its purpose is to help legal 
practitioners, law enforcement officials and representatives of 
victim assistance services from EU Member States and candidate 
countries to set up Europe-wide networks, and exchange 
information and best practices. It also aims at encouraging EU 
Member States to step-up co-operation among each other as well 
as with candidate and other partner countries. AGIS supports trans-
national projects via grant contracts for a maximum duration of two 
years, which are concluded by the European Commission with the 
beneficiaries, following a call for proposals launched each year. 
Under the new financial framework 2007-2013, the EU has 
decided to set up new programmes and to considerably increase its 
budgetary allocations for the creation of an area of freedom, 
security and justice. On the basis of three European Commission 
communications in 2005 proposing the creation of three general 
programmes on "Fundamental Rights and Justice",5 "Security and 
Safeguarding Liberties"6 and "Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows",7 the EU has already reached an agreement in 
mid 2006, which paves the way for their formal adoption before the 
end of 2006.  
Particularly relevant in the area of crime prevention and criminal 
justice are: 
• the specific programme on "Criminal Justice", to be established 
under the general programme "Fundamental Rights and 
Justice", with a reference amount of 196 M€ for the period 
2007-2013; 
• the specific programme on "Prevention of and Fight against 
Crime", to be established under the general programme 
"Security and Safeguarding Liberties", with a reference amount 
of 645 M€ for the period 2007-2013. 
 
While the first one focuses in particular on improving cooperation 
in criminal matters between the judicial authorities of EU Member 
States, based on mutual recognition of decisions and on mutual 
confidence, the second programme aims to contribute to a high 
level of security for citizens by strengthening in particular the 
cooperation between the competent law enforcement authorities, 
and the protection of victims and witnesses of crime.  
                                                     
4 The "AGIS" programme was set up by Council decision 2002/630/JHA of 22 
July 2002 (Official Journal of the EU, L 203, 1.8.2002, p. 5). 
5 COM(2005) 122 final of 6 April 2005. 
6 COM(2005) 124 final of 6 April 2005. 
7 COM(2005) 123 final/2 of 2 May 2005. 
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Both programmes will support trans-national projects involving at 
least two EU Member States or one EU Member State and a 
candidate country, or activities of non-governmental organisations 
pursuing the programmes' objectives on a European dimension, as 
well as specific projects initiated and managed by the European 
Commission. Access to these programmes will be open to the 
competent administrations of the EU Member States, as well as to 
public or private organisations, including professional 
organisations, universities, research institutes and non-
governmental organisations from EU Member States. The 
European Commission will provide the funding mainly via grants 
following a call for proposals, and in the case of accompanying 
measures also via public procurement contracts following a call for 
tender. Trans-national projects may not be presented by non-EU 
countries or by international organisations, but they may participate 
as partners. This restriction applies because on the one hand these 
programmes are centred on the EU, and on the other to avoid the 
risk of overlapping with EU policies and instruments in its external 
relations. 
 
 
EU Financial Mobilisation for its Role as a Global Player 
 
At the international level, the main external EU policies which also 
allow for the mobilisation of extensive financial resources are the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)8 and the 
Development Cooperation Policy.9  
The CFSP, which comprises also the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), aims in particular to preserve peace and 
international security, in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. It is under the umbrella of the CFSP that 
the EU can decide joint actions which are in general focused on 
peacekeeping operations and short term crisis responses including 
military means, but which in their civilian crisis management 
aspects may also address issues like policing, security system 
reform and criminal justice, as well as the fight against organised 
crime and terrorism. While the funding for joint actions which does 
not have military or defence implications under the CFSP has been 
rather limited under the financial framework 2000-2006, the amount 
of the CFSP budget for the period 2007-2013 will be considerably 
increased up to 1.740 M€. 
                                                     
8 Title V of the EU Treaty, also referred to as the "second pillar" of the EU (see 
footnote 1).  
9 Title XX (articles 177-181) of the EC Treaty.  
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As regards development policy and external aid, it is important to 
recall that the EU is not just one donor but actually 26 (and soon 
28): each of the EU Member States and the European 
Commission. This stems from the fact that according to article 177 
of the EC Treaty, development cooperation is a shared 
competence between the EC and the Member States. While the EU 
all together provides 55% of the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) worldwide and is thus by far the largest donor, the European 
Commission taken alone is the third largest donor of ODA in the 
world after the USA and Japan. The presence of so many donors in 
the EU of course causes difficulties in terms of coordination, 
coherence and complementarity, which are addressed through the 
recent commitments and measures taken by the EU to increase aid 
effectiveness. 
These commitments are complemented by the EU’s effort to 
achieve in parallel a radical overhaul of the EC external aid 
instruments managed by the European Commission. So far, 
external aid has been managed on the basis of a very broad and 
disparate range of geographical and thematic instruments which 
have been adopted, often in an ad-hoc manner, over time. While 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries have benefited 
since the 60’s from external aid under the European Development 
Fund (EDF),10 other regional instruments were adopted in the 90’s 
following the profound political and economic changes at the end of 
the cold war. These are the PHARE programme for the candidate 
countries in Eastern Europe, the CARDS programme for the 
countries of the Western Balkans, the TACIS programme for the 
new countries emerging from the collapsed Soviet Union, the 
MEDA programme for the countries in Northern Africa and the Near 
East, and finally the ALA programme for the countries in Asia and 
Latin America. In addition, to these regional instruments, more than 
20 other geographical and thematic programmes, often with very 
specific objectives, have been adopted.  
This plethora of instruments and their inconsistency and 
complexity due to differences in legal bases, objectives, 
programming and procedures has resulted in increasing difficulty 
for the European Commission to manage these instruments in an 
efficient and coordinated way. Therefore, in view of the new 
financial framework for 2007-2013, the European Commission 
proposed in September 2004 a new, rationalised and simplified 
framework of instruments to replace the current set of external aid 
                                                     
10 The EU signed with the ACP countries first the Lomé Conventions I-IV and in 
2000 the Cotonou Agreement. Development assistance under these agreements 
has so far been implemented via a specific fund covering each time five years, 
the European Development Fund (EDF), which is not part of the EC budget unlike 
all other external aid programmes. The current 9th EDF covers the period 2003-
2007. 
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programmes from 2007 onwards.11 This will reduce them to six 
instruments, of which four are new ones,12 and which will 
complement the existing Humanitarian Aid Instrument and Macro 
Financial Assistance Instrument. The latter have already proved 
their efficiency and, therefore, will both continue to exist as specific 
thematic instruments under the new framework.  
After nearly two years of negotiations on this package of new 
instruments between the European Commission, the Council of the 
EU and the European Parliament, a tripartite meeting at political 
level held on 26 June 2006 identified the elements for a 
compromise, and a global political agreement was reached. While 
the structure of the initial Commission proposal has been 
somewhat altered in the sense that some of the proposed 
instruments have been split, notably because of the position of the 
European Parliament,13 the final architecture still respects the 
overall objective of simplification and increased effectiveness. In 
parallel to these negotiations, the outcome of the discussions on 
the new financial framework 2007-2013 was very positive in terms 
of a considerable increase of financial allocations to external aid. 
Thus concretely, the new external aid instruments and the 
respective reference amounts under the new financial framework 
2007-2013 will be:14  
• the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which will 
provide assistance to candidate countries and potential 
candidate countries for accession to the EU, with a reference 
amount of 11.468 M€;15 
                                                     
11 Communication of 29 September 2004 from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on the Instruments for External Assistance under 
the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013, COM(2004) 626 final. 
12 The package proposed by the European Commission comprised three 
geographical instruments (an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, a 
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and a Development and Economic 
Cooperation Instrument), as well as an Instrument for Stability as a specific 
thematic instrument. 
13 The European Parliament asked for a separate Democracy and Human Rights 
instrument, as well as a split between development and industrialised countries. 
Furthermore, the Council decided to split the issue of nuclear safety from the 
Instrument for Stability and did not follow the Commission proposal to incorporate 
the EDF in the EC budget, which also had as an effect that the ACP countries will 
not be covered by the Development Cooperation Instrument. 
14 While the formal adoption of most of the new instruments will still take place 
before the end of 2006, a few will probably be adopted only in the course of 2007 
due to the delay in the negotiation process. 
15 Current candidate countries are Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey, while the potential candidate countries are 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia (including Kosovo). 
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• the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which 
will contribute to greater political, economic, cultural and 
security cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, with a 
reference amount of 11.181 M€;16  
• the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which will be 
composed of geographic programmes for developing countries 
not covered by the IPA, the ENPI or the EDF,17 as well as five 
thematic programmes supporting actions in all developing 
countries (including those covered by the ENPI and the EDF) 
and global actions, with a reference amount of 16.897 M€;18 
• the Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI) for specific 
cooperation activities with countries which are excluded from 
ODA-eligibility, with a reference amount of 172 M€;  
• the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR), which will support the development of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights, in particular in countries where 
these issues are not considered as priorities for their 
development, and with a reference amount of 1.104 M€; 
• the Instrument for Stability (IfS), which on the one hand would 
contribute to stability in a situation of crisis, and on the other 
help build capacity in the context of stable conditions to address 
specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilising 
effect, with a reference amount of 2.062 M€; 
• the Nuclear Safety Instrument (NSI), which will finance 
measures to support a higher level of nuclear safety, with a 
reference amount of 524 M€. 
 
In addition to these, the ACP countries will continue to be 
financed through the EDF. The 10th EDF, to which over 24 billion € 
will be allocated, will run from 2008 onwards and will be managed 
by the European Commission on the basis of a specific regulation 
to be adopted by the Council. 
While the need for simplification and rationalisation explains why 
there is no specific external aid instrument or budget allocation for 
issues such as crime prevention and criminal justice, the new 
geographic instruments as well as the IfS and the EIDHR do of 
course explicitly cover these issues in the framework of support for 
good governance, rule of law and security, whose importance for 
development has been increasingly emphasised in recent years. As 
does the UN, the EU recognises that security is a prerequisite for  
                                                     
16 The ENPI will cover the following countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
Palestinian Authority, Russia, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
17 Geographic programmes under the DCI will exist for the following regions: Latin 
America, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and South Africa. 
18 The five thematic programmes are: human and social development, 
environment, non-state actors in development, food security, migration and 
asylum. 
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development. For instance, the European Security Strategy 
adopted in December 2003 identifies terrorism, organised crime 
and state failure due to weak governance among the main threats 
to global security, and thus calls also for the EU development policy 
to tackle these threats together with partner countries.19 
Furthermore, the 2005 EU Strategy for the external dimension of 
Justice and Home Affairs requires adequate funding for JHA issues 
under the new external aid instruments.20 
The growing importance of security aspects in external aid is 
particularly well illustrated by the new Instrument for Stability.21 
One major aim of the IfS is to provide technical and financial 
assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, 
which according to article 3 of the IfS shall cover inter alia the areas 
of "an independent judiciary, good governance and law and order, 
including non-military technical cooperation to strengthen overall 
civilian control and oversight over the security system and 
measures to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement and 
judicial authorities involved in the fight against the trafficking of 
people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials". In the context of 
stable conditions for cooperation, but where there are threats to law 
and public order or to the security and safety of individuals, article 4 
of the IfS foresees that "assistance shall cover strengthening the 
capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities 
involved in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, 
including trafficking of drugs, people, firearms and explosive 
materials and in the effective control of illegal trade and transit. (…) 
With regard to assistance to authorities involved in the fight against 
terrorism, priority shall be given to supporting measures concerning 
the development and strengthening of counter-terrorism legislation, 
financial law, implementation and practice, customs law, 
implementation and practice, immigration law, implementation and 
practice, and the development of international procedures for law 
enforcement." 
                                                     
19 The European Security Strategy is available on the website of the Council: 
www.consilium.europa.eu. 
20 Council conclusions of 1 and 5 December 2005. The Council conclusions and 
the Strategy are available on the website of the Council: www.consilium. europa. 
eu. 
21 The draft Regulation establishing an Instrument for Stability has already been 
agreed at political level on 3 May 2006 at the Council (see Council document N° 
7443/3/06 Rev 3 of 11 May 2006) and on 6 July 2006 at the European 
Parliament, so that it should formally be adopted and enter into force before the 
end of 2006. 
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EU External Aid Programming and Implementation 
 
While the EU legal framework of external aid instruments is 
undergoing a profound reform towards simplification and 
rationalisation, the EU principles of programming its external aid 
will basically remain unchanged, with just a few procedural 
changes aiming to improve aid effectiveness further: 
• multi-annual EU strategies agreed by the European Commission 
and the EU Member States aligned with the policies of the 
partner countries and regions, so as to ensure in particular 
continuity and predictability of funding; 
• the full respect of partnership and local ownership by aligning 
the EU support on strategies, institutions and procedures of the 
partners; 
• coherence with other internal and external EU policies (e.g. the 
JHA policy); 
• integration or mainstreaming of specific issues (e.g. the fight 
against terrorism) in broader sector policies (e.g. governance, 
security sector reform); 
• donors coherence, coordination and complementarity, notably 
via the concentration by the European Commission on a few 
focal sectors where it has a comparative advantage with respect 
to EU Member States and other donors. 
 
Concretely, the EU aid delivery in the framework of geographic 
instruments is first programmed on the basis of Country Strategy 
Papers (CSP) or Regional Strategy Papers (RSP), which also 
contain national or regional indicative programmes (NIP/RIP) 
identifying in general two focal and a few additional non-focal 
sectors of intervention of the European Commission together with 
specific objectives, expected results, as well as a timeframe and 
indicative financial allocations. As the CSP and RSP are agreed 
with the relevant partner country or region, and increasingly with 
other donors as well, the inclusion of issues like crime prevention 
and criminal justice in the CSP and RSP under a focal or non-focal 
sector of good governance or rule of law also depends very much 
on the partners' priorities and the activities of other donors. On the 
other hand, thematic instruments are programmed via multi-annual 
thematic strategy papers, where the agreement of the partner 
countries does not in all cases have to be sought or may even be 
impossible because of the very nature and objective of the 
instrument, as for instance in the case of the EIDHR.  
As a result, in the case of the geographic instruments, the 
implementation phase generally starts with the conclusion of a 
financing agreement between the European Commission and the 
beneficiary state or region for each action identified in the 
CSP/RSP and NIP/RIP. The financing agreement defines inter alia 
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the objectives, the results, the activities and the implementation 
partners and modalities of the intervention. In the still rather new 
and often very sensitive area of security and JHA, the European 
Commission and the partner countries increasingly prefer EU 
Member States’ competent administrations or specialised 
international organisations as implementing partners, due to their 
specific expertise, but also the institutional legitimacy which may be 
required. In the case of the thematic instruments, the 
implementation starts with the adoption of annual action 
programmes which specify in more detail the actions foreseen by 
the NIP/RIP and the implementation methods. 
The aid delivery methods used by the EU can be divided into 
three categories: the project approach, the sector approach and the 
macro or general approach. While the project approach follows the 
classical EC contract and finance rules as laid down in the EC 
Financial Regulation,22 the macro approach operates via general or 
sector budget support.23 Finally, the sector approach allows for all 
types of implementation: sector budget support, EC contract and 
finance rules, or the participation in so-called "pool" or "basket" 
funds managed by the leading donor in the sector. The EU, using 
the traditional project approach in the public sector of partner 
countries, has experienced recurrent problems of sustainability. 
These have been due to the too frequent lack of ownership and 
coherence with partner policies, as well as the high transaction 
costs. Consequently, the new EU development policy prioritises 
budget support and sector approaches. However, the EU will apply 
a flexible and pragmatic approach and thus also continue to 
implement traditional projects where the conditions for the other aid 
delivery methods are not met, or where the project approach is 
justified, in particular with regard to technical assistance projects 
aimed at capacity-building in partner countries. 
                                                     
22 Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 
(OJ L 248, 16.9.2002). The EC Financial Regulation is currently under revision in 
view of the new financial framework, notably to introduce more flexibility with 
regard to external actions. The details of the rules are laid down in the Practical 
Guide to contracting procedures for EC external actions, which is available under 
the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/europeaid/tender/gestion/ index_ 
en.htm. 
23 Budget support is the transfer of financial resources of an external financing 
agency to the National Treasury of a partner country, following the respect by the 
latter of agreed conditions for payment. The financial resources thus received are 
part of the global resources of the partner country, and consequently used in 
accordance with the public financial management system of the partner country. 
While general budget support represents a transfer to the National Treasury in 
support of a national development or reform policy and strategy, sector budget 
support represents a transfer to the national treasury in support of a sector 
programme policy and strategy 
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The new external aid instruments therefore continue to foresee 
the full range of measures for implementation, with first of all the 
traditional procurement contracts (service, supply and works 
contracts) which are in general concluded following a call for 
tender. Another essential modality is the grant contract which is in 
principle concluded following a call for proposals, but in certain 
circumstances may be concluded via a direct agreement, as in the 
case of joint management with an international organisation (in this 
case it is called a "contribution agreement") if the action is co-
funded by another donor (which can but does not need to be the 
international organisation itself).24 A specific category of the grant 
contract is the so-called “twinning contract”, which was initially 
developed for the candidate countries but will be extended by the 
new instruments to all partner countries of the EU. Twinning takes 
place between the partner country and an EU Member State 
administration seconding an expert to a corresponding 
administration of that country. Eligibility for funding depends on the 
type of measure used for the implementation, but potentially covers 
all public and private bodies of the EU Member States and the 
partner countries, including all types of non-state actors, as well as 
international organisations and European agencies. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the EU has not only acted on its commitment to 
increase its financial mobilisation in the internal and external field of 
JHA and to increase external aid in general, but it has also effected 
a complete overhaul of its funding instruments under the new 
financial framework 2007-2013, with the aim of meeting its 
challenges of fully becoming a global player.  
The ratification and entry into force of the new EU Constitutional 
Treaty would of course have facilitated the role of the EU in these 
areas, notably by merging the three “pillars” in one single and more 
coherent treaty and by creating a EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
The latter would be at the same time a member of the European 
Commission and the Council, and thus coordinate the CFSP with 
all the EC policies relevant for external relations. Such an approach 
by the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs would also have been 
supported by a new European External Action Service to be 
created with relevant personnel from the European Commission, 
the Secretariat General of the Council of the EU and the Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member States.  
                                                     
24Joint management is very common with the UN, with the consequence that the 
European Commission and the UN have signed on 29 April 2003 a Financial and 
Administrative Framework Agreement applicable to most UN organisations and 
bodies and defining the respective obligations and mechanisms in terms of 
coordination and financial aspects of their cooperation. 
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At present, these important reforms cannot yet take place due to 
the stalled ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty following 
the negative referenda in 2005 in France and the Netherlands. 
However, when implemented, the new financial and legislative 
framework should give the EU the necessary tools, and first and 
foremost the impetus, to enhance its role as a global player and to 
contribute more efficiently to development, security and justice 
throughout the world, including in the area of crime prevention and 
criminal justice. 
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Any strategy to maximize the effectiveness of the technical 
assistance (TA) provided to Member States in the fields of crime 
prevention and criminal justice necessarily refers us to the need for 
systematic evaluations of current initiatives. Many insightful 
comments and suggestions have already been made on that 
question during the workshop on the same theme organized by the 
Programme Network of Institutes. For the sake of brevity, I will limit 
my comments to three main questions that may help us focus our 
thoughts during the remainder of this discussion: what kind of 
evaluation is needed? How should TA evaluation be conducted? 
What can be done to encourage States to develop their own 
capacity to monitor the performance of their own agencies? 
 
 
The Kind of Evaluations Needed  
 
Clearly, we do not stand a chance to improve the effectiveness of 
the technical assistance we deliver and the capacity building 
initiatives we undertake unless we can measure and understand 
their impact. What is needed is an emphasis on measuring 
outcomes and impacts, rather than on monitoring activities and the 
delivery of outputs.  
We all know of course that measuring outcomes is far more 
challenging than keeping track of outputs. There are outcomes that 
cannot be measured in the short term because their effects only 
become visible over longer periods of time. Furthermore, the 
impact of one particular intervention may not always be 
distinguishable from the impact of another. The objectives of an 
intervention may not always have been sufficiently articulated for 
an evaluation to determine whether they have successfully been 
achieved. Baseline data and basic criminal justice statistics are 
often unavailable or unreliable. Clearly, there are methodological 
issues involved in measuring the impact of justice reforms and 
technical assistance, but they are not insurmountable. 
One can rarely evaluate the impact of the TA provided without 
evaluating the impact of the reforms that the assistance is 
purporting to support. Therein lie a number of issues about 
ownership over the evaluation process, the objectives, design and 
timing of the evaluation, as well as its scope and its costs.  
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One cannot evaluate results without reference to baseline data. 
The recent work of the UNODC Criminal Justice Reform Unit (Rule 
of Law Section) to develop a “criminal justice assessment toolkit” 
should help provide a basis, not only for the planning of technical 
assistance and justice reform activities, but also for measuring the 
impact of the technical assistance provided.  
In the same manner, the development - and eventual adoption 
by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice - of a 
set of guidelines, based on best practices, for the provision of 
technical assistance in the fields of crime prevention and criminal 
justice would also be very relevant to the monitoring and evaluation 
of technical assistance activities and their impact. 
Evaluations are often part of the accountability structure of TA 
programmes. Let us not forget, however, that the fundamental 
purpose of any evaluation is to learn. How can we make optimum 
use of evaluation findings? In my view, we should still be 
concerned about the limited extent to which evaluation findings and 
knowledge about best practices are currently shared among 
jurisdictions and agencies. We should be concerned about the 
limited extent to which they inspire new programming. We must 
therefore find ways to make evaluation findings and information 
about best practices more readily available to programme 
developers and policy makers.  
The current state of knowledge about “lessons learned” in TA, 
capacity building and justice reform initiatives is a consequence of 
at least two interrelated factors. The first one is what Carothers 
refers to as a “disturbingly thin base of knowledge at every level”, 
particularly with respect to how change actually occurs, how it can 
be supported, and what effects it tends to have on resistant 
systems.1 The second is the failure of donor agencies and recipient 
jurisdictions to develop the capacity to evaluate and to develop a 
cumulative knowledge about “what works” and the specific factors 
that facilitate, or hinder, reform efforts.2  
 
 
How TA Evaluations Should Be Conducted 
 
A disappointing attribute of many TA assistance projects in the 
justice sector is the absence of measurable performance indicators. 
Most often, intended outcomes are couched in very general, 
bureaucratic language. It is the rare project that contains specific, 
                                                     
1 Carothers, T. (2003). Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad – The Problem of 
Knowledge. Working Paper No. 34. Washington (D.C.): Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, January 2003, p. 13.  
2 See also: Channell, W. (2005). Lessons Not Learned: Problems with Western 
Aid for Law Reform in Postcommunist Countries. Working Paper No. 57. 
Washington (D.C.): Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy 
and Rule of Law Project, January 2003. 
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measurable objectives. Future TA activities and capacity 
development initiatives should be designed to maximize learning.  
The development of performance indicators to measure the 
impact of training initiatives, capacity-building programs and 
institutional reforms should become a priority. These indicators 
should be simple, appealing, and useful to national and local 
governments. In the area of policing, for example, these indicators 
should attempt to assess the extent to which the development 
assistance initiative has contributed to public safety and access to 
justice. Performance indicators should also be designed with 
reference to applicable international human rights and justice 
standards3, including indicators for assessing the capacities of 
rights holders and duty bearers4. As well, donor agencies should 
build in an evaluative component, ideally providing for an 
independent assessment of outcomes, particularly in larger, longer-
term initiatives. A key requirement is that there be strong linkage 
between the training offered and the reform goals that are 
contemplated. 
Many of the guiding principles that are now being articulated by 
development agencies5 for the provision of TA in the field of crime 
prevention and criminal justice are also directly relevant to the TA 
evaluation process. Several speakers during discussions today and 
yesterday have explained how TA should be recipient-driven, 
timely, sustainable, offered over the long term and in a coordinated 
manner among donors. The same holds true also of TA 
evaluations.  
Ownership: Just like ownership over the planning and 
prioritization of reforms and TA initiatives is being advocated, I 
must emphasize the importance of local ownership over the design 
and planning of the evaluation of the TA and the reforms it 
supports. Ownership over the findings of the evaluation and the 
lessons learned should also be facilitated by the evaluation 
process.  
Recipient countries frequently look at evaluations as a 
necessary evil, something that must be done to satisfy the donor’s 
requirements and increase the likelihood of future assistance. They 
are often frustrated when the evaluation process seems to delay 
decisions about future funding. Yet, recipient countries are rarely 
treated as the principal clients for an evaluation and the main 
                                                     
3 Broome, J. and Inman, M. (2005). “Using International Standards as Tools for 
Judicial Reform”, in EBRC, Law in Transition 2005 – Courts and Judges. London: 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, pp. 80-87. 
4 UNDP (2006). Indicators for Human Rights Based Approaches to Development 
in UNDP Programming – A Users’ Guide, New York: NDP, Bureau for 
Development Policy, Democratic Governance Group. 
5 See for example: OECD (2005). Security System Reform and Governance. 
DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
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eventual users of its findings. This is something that must be 
corrected. 
Timeliness: Just as the timeliness of technical assistance is 
crucial to its success, so is the timeliness of the evaluation and the 
timely availability of its findings in relation to future programming.  
Whole sector approaches: Evaluations are often planned and 
conducted in a piecemeal, ad hoc, uncoordinated manner. Whole 
sector, carefully planned, approaches to evaluation should be 
considered if we are serious about drawing the lessons that should 
be learned from current TA initiatives.  
Sustainability: Information systems and data gathering systems 
are often developed which are primarily dictated by the donor’s 
requirements for accountability and the need for demonstrable 
results. These tend to be unsustainable. They also often tend to 
have been developed without a proper assessment of the 
information requirements of the recipient state. To be sustainable 
and efficient, impact and performance monitoring systems should 
be integrated into the management function of criminal justice 
institutions.  
One of the main lessons learned over the years with respect to 
data gathering and various continuous monitoring mechanisms is 
that these systems must be integrated into the programme 
management process and produce information that is relevant to 
the managers themselves.  
Taking the long view - Capacity building issues: Evaluation 
requirements are too often developed without much regard for the 
capacity of local consultants and researchers to conduct those 
evaluations. As a result, the local programme evaluation capacity is 
hardly ever developed, and individuals who may not have first-hand 
knowledge of local circumstances, contingencies and strengths 
conduct the necessary evaluations. We should urgently look at 
measures that could be taken at the national and regional levels to 
develop, over time, a greater capacity to conduct research and 
evaluation.  
Donors and assistance providers should make a greater effort to 
adapt their evaluation instruments, process and methodologies to 
the special needs and limited capacity of developing countries, 
particularly small developing states.  
Resources: There is no data on the proportion of resources 
devoted to evaluation as compared to the resources to technical 
assistance and capacity building. I would venture to say that even 
within the UNODC’s own TA programmes, this ratio is quite small. 
Good evaluations are rarely inexpensive and the resources that 
they consume are often seen as resources that have been diverted 
away from other more important priorities. This false perception 
should be addressed. 
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Donor coordination: Without donor coordination, one may see 
several assessments occurring simultaneously, often working at 
cross-purposes, and imposing an unnecessary burden on the 
recipient country. This should be avoided. 
Sharing lessons: Conducting the evaluations is only one part of 
the solution. Learning from them is the other part. Unfortunately, as 
was recently pointed out in an OECD working paper, “the learning 
and dissemination of lessons, both negative and positive, has been 
needlessly slow”.6 To maximize learning there must be a more 
effective dissemination of the results of these evaluations across 
agencies and countries.  
 
 
Suggestions  
 
States must be encouraged to develop their own capacity to 
monitor the operation and performance of the own agencies and 
systems. Systems to track a manageable number of indicators for 
which data is cost-effectively available are required. Tools could be 
developed to assist States in the development of such indicators. 
For example, the UNODC Criminal Justice Reform Unit, in 
collaboration with UNICEF, has just produced a manual for the 
measurement of juvenile justice indicators. 
We must endeavour to establish results-oriented reporting and 
assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key 
dimensions of criminal justice sector reform strategies. In so doing, 
we must take care to articulate the relevance of these frameworks 
to international standards, and where applicable, to the relevant 
international obligations of the States. The Commission should 
consider playing an active role in the development of a consensus 
around commonly agreed indicators of the impact and outcome of 
TA.  
It is crucial to help recipient countries develop their own 
evaluation and monitoring capacity. To do so, one could consider 
developing an international programme for technical assistance 
evaluation training. The UNODC could take a lead role in 
developing such a programme, much like the Independent 
Evaluation Group of the World Bank did in the field of economic 
and social development in collaboration with Carleton University, 
Ottawa, Canada.7 
One could also envisage developing a cooperation network 
among those involved in evaluating justice capacity development 
                                                     
6 OECD/DAC (2005). The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards 
Good Practice. Paris: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, February 
2006. 
7 The International Program for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET). A joint 
collaboration of the World Bank and Carleton University (see: www.ipdet.org).  
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and reform initiatives. Certainly there is a need for practical 
mechanisms for information sharing around evaluation findings, 
lessons learned, and best practices. An international database on 
the findings of a broad range of TA evaluations conducted in the 
fields of criminal justice and crime prevention could certainly be a 
very valuable tool for promoting more effective criminal justice 
reform and capacity building initiatives.  
Finally, the UNODC has set up an Independent Evaluation Unit 
to provide feedback to the organization and its stakeholders on the 
efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the Office’s programs 
and technical assistance activities. The Unit emphasizes the 
assessment of outcomes and looks for lessons learned. The 
Commission may wish to consider measures to enhance the 
capacity of the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit and provide 
more specific directions for its future work.  
I hope that you have found these comments useful for launching 
the coming discussion.  
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